תלמוד על סנהדרין 8:9

“And they spread out the cloth.⁸⁸Deut. 22:17. It was proven that this sentence cannot mean what it says.” That is all simile. Rebbi Ismael stated: That is one of three verses in the Torah which have been written as simile⁸⁹Sifry Deut. 237; in Finkelstein’s opinion not of the original Sifry text. A slightly enlarged version is in Sanhedrin 8:8, 26c 1. 6.. “If he gets up and walks outside on his support, the one who hit him is not prosecuted.⁹⁰Ex. 21:19, speaking of a person who deliberatly injures another. Mekhilta dR. Ismael Mišpaṭim 6; Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai p. 174.” Could anybody think that one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But what is “on his support”, in his health⁹¹If the injured person regains his health but then has a relapse and dies, the person who injured him cannot be prosecuted for murder.. “If the sun shone on him, he has blood.⁹²Ex. 22:2, speaking of a thief digging a tunnel under a house, who can be killed with impunity if found out since in the tunnel “he has no blood”.” Does the sun shine only on him? But just as the sun is particular that it brings peace to the entire world, so also this one, if one knows that [the other] is at peace with him and he kills him, he is guilty⁹³In the opinion of the Babli, Sanhedrin 72a/b, this can only be asserted of a father coming to steal from his son. In the opinion of the Yerushalmi (Note 89) it cannot be asserted of anybody. Cf. Mekhilta dR. Ismael Mišpaṭim 13; differently in Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai p. 192..

It was stated “compromised”. Not that she reduced her ketubah¹⁶⁷This statement is quoted in Šebuot 7:7 (38a 1. 25), Sanhedrin 8:6 (26b 1. 49); Babli 87b.. If her ketubah was 200 but she claims a mina, she is paid without an oath¹⁶⁸In the Babli, this is made more explicit: If her ketubah was 1000 zuz, the husband claims that it was paid but he has no receipt, the divorced wife states that she received nothing but that her claim was only a mina, this is not conceding part of the husband’s claim (cf. Note 166) and she collects without an oath. It seems that the Yerushalmi would agree to that interpretation.
On documents which show that 200 zuz written in the ketubah might mean 100 zuz in actual money (and the standards by which the value of a zuz is determined), cf. M. A. Friedman, loc. cit. Note 87.. What is the difference between one who compromises and one who claims less? Rebbi Ḥanina said, if she compromises there was a transaction between them¹⁶⁹Therefore, the oath is required if only to protect creditors with claims against the estate.; if she claims less there was no transaction between them¹⁷⁰At least, there is no presumption of any transactions between her and her husband regarding her ketubah during her marriage. Therefore, anybody claiming that there was such a transaction in order to impose an oath on the widow would have to prove his case in court..

“If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. ¹⁸⁷The Halakhah is repeated in Giṭṭin 5:3, Šebuot 7:9. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due¹⁸⁸To preserve the orphan’s property. In the Babli, ‘Arakhin 22a, this opinion is ascribed to Rav Assi., and some say¹⁸⁹In the almost parallel text in Šebuot 7:9, this is attributed to R. Nathan [who is called “some say” in the Babli (Horaiot 13b)]; in the Babli (loc. cit.) it, together with R. Yannai’s explanation, appears in R. Joḥanan’s name., also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection¹⁹⁰Mishnah 11:2 states that a married woman, for whose upkeep the husband is responsible, and whose husband does not fulfill his support duty, may sell from the estate without court supervision. The same holds for the estate after the husband’s death as long as the ketubah was not paid. R. Simeon grants this right only to the definitively married woman and the wife who becomes a widow after definitive marriage, but not to the preliminarily married who cannot claim support but only ketubah if widowed or divorced. Mishnah 11:1 gives the estate the right to the widow’s earnings in exchange for the support; it is held that R. Simeon thinks that, in general, the amount needed for her support is greater than her prospective earnings (Babli loc. cit.).. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her¹⁹¹Since in those times a single woman had few possibilities of earning a living, if the heirs were not her children she needed the ketubah as dowry to attract a new husband.. Some say, also for robbery and torts¹⁹²If the father had been found guilty of robbery or causing damage but died before he paid the sums assessed by the court.. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.¹⁹³Mishnah Baba Qama 10:1: “If somebody robbed and used the proceeds to feed his children, [if the father died] they do not have to pay. But if it was mortgageable [real estate], they have to pay.”” For torts from the following¹⁹⁴Mishnah Giṭṭin 5:2.: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.¹⁹⁵An estate’s real estate holdings are classified by their values per unit of area. It is assumed that the higher the unit value, the easier it is to sell the property. The debtor in general will try to satisfy his obligations with real estate of the lowest quality. The property which per unit area is valued highest is called עידִית “elite”, the average בֵּינוֹנִית “medium”, and the lowest זִיבּוֹרִית “stony field”. These categories are not absolute; they refer to the holdings of an individual.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable¹⁹⁶This statement was not discussed by J. N. Epstein in his treatment of כֵּינִי מַתְנִיתָא (cf. Note 199). The statement should not be considered as emendation. A simple reading of the text will require that the statement apply to all cases in which an orphan’s real estate is to be alienated. In the opinion of both Talmudim (Giṭṭin 5:1, Babli 48b–50a; Baba meṣi‘a 9:14, 12b 1. 11) rabbinic practice demands that tort judgments have to be satisfied by best quality, financial debts by medium quality, and ketubah by lowest quality. In the opinion of most authorities, biblical law requires only minimal quality for the settlement of financial obligations. The rabbinic upgrading was a necessity to make it easier for people to get a loan. Since this argument is irrelevant for orphans, one does not need the Mishnah to know that mortgage debts paid by an estate are settled by low quality real estate. Where the Mishnah is really needed is payment for torts for which (Ex. 22:4) “the best of his fields or the best of his vineyards” are required. The statement therefore should be read: One pays even for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable; cf. Tosaphot 84a, s. v.לכתובת אשה.. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable¹⁹⁷The rules for the adult heir are the same as they would have been for the bequeather.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here¹⁹⁷The rules for the adult heir are the same as they would have been for the bequeather. about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.

The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future²²¹The Babli, 80b and Niddah 47b, disagrees and treats the man who at age 20 has no pubic hair and shows the body characteristics of a castrate as castrated by nature who never will be accepted as a man; otherwise he will be a minor until age 35, half the normal life span. (There is an Amora who disagrees and holds that many cases of impotent men without pubic hair can be treated medically.). Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future²²²In the Babli, 80a, Rav holds that if he or she are late to grow pubic hair but do so before they reach 20, they retroactively become adult and can be prosecuted for any crimes committed earlier; Samuel holds that they remain underage until they grow pubic hair or reach age 18 when they immediately become adults.. A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son²²³Deut. 21:18–21. Since he is called “son” rather than “child”, it is concluded that he must be an adult. The Babli concurs, 80a. since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings²²⁴The opinion of R. Simeon ben Laqish in the next Chapter; Babli Makkot 16a. In the Babli, that opinion is unopposed.. Our Mishnah²²⁵That the legal status of one 20 years old is not different from one 9 years old if he did not grow two pubic hairs. disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day²²⁶Even though the text is formulated in the masculine, it must refer to girls since for a boy standard adulthood is at age 13., he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty²²⁷But if he grows pubic hair by his 20th birthday, he retroactively becomes an adult from age 13..