תלמוד על נדרים 11:13

For whom is it needed⁹The clause in the Mishnah that the husband has only the usufruct of any inheritance coming to his wife during the marriage.? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand¹⁰Similarly, R. Meïr holds that a wife cannot act legally except as her husband’s representative. It would seem reasonable that a wife can retain separate property by prenuptial agreement (cf. Yebamot 7:1, Note 1), but for R. Meïr one would expect that a wife can only acquire an inheritance as representative for her husband. Therefore, it is essential that the Mishnah state that an inheritance becomes the wife’s sole property for which the husband has to act as administrator. Cf. Nedarim 11:8, Note 70; Ma‘aser Šeni 4:4, Note 95; Babli Nedarim 88b, Qiddušin 23b. and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it¹¹The inheritance. are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated¹²Mishnah Baba Meṣi‘a 1:5.: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave¹³It is not required that the slave be Phoenician. Any non-Jewish slave who became semi-Jewish by circumcision (for a male) and immersion in a miqweh is called “Canaanite slave”. In the theory of the Babli, the Canaanite slave’s body is the property of his master; therefore, if the slave lifts a find to acquire it, it is legally his master whose hand took it. or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave¹⁴While the rules for the treatment of Hebrew slaves (Ex. 21:1–11) are a frequent topic in the Talmudim, the subject is purely theoretical since the institution of Hebrew slavery disappeared with the end of the First Commonwealth. It is asserted that only the working capability of the slave is the master’s, not his body. Therefore, if he lifts a find to acquire it, it is not the master’s hand which lifts the find. or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work¹⁵Obviously, the master can direct the Hebrew slave to perform any task he asks of him; but he cannot direct him not to use his hands for anything else.. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work¹⁶In Chapter 5, an exhaustive list was given of work the husband can demand from his wife. The wife’s body certainly is not her husband’s property. Therefore, one does not understand why her find should be her husband’s. and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel¹⁷One has such a poor opinion of Jewish husbands that one is afraid he would be offended if the wife would not share her find with him [mentioned also in Baba Meṣi‘a 1:5 (8a 1. 15)]. This is the only explanation offered in the Babli, 96a; it is called “because of jealousy”.. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away¹⁸Meaning: stealing. any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift¹⁹The gift can be given on condition that the husband have no right to it. Should the wife not be believed if she says she received a gift?! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that²⁰R. Yose will agree that in the case of a find in the presence of other people his reason is invalid. He holds that, nevertheless, the rabbinic decree giving the find to the husband stands because ịt would be impractical to admit exceptions.. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they²¹This refers to the adult children to whom the Mishnah in Baba Meṣi‘a assigns their finds. This is qualified; the Mishnah applies only if the children are financially independent. In the Babli, this is formulated that “they are not dependent on their father’s table.” Cf. Peah 4:6, Note 107; Baba Meṣi‘a 1:5 (8a 1.3); Babli Baba Meṣi‘a 12b. are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.

²⁸The argument about the wife’s vow is from Nedarim 11:1, Notes 23–25. Why can he not force his wife? Did not Rebbi Huna say, [if she vowed] any benefit from me [shall be forbidden] to you, he forces her and sleeps with her. Any benefit from you [shall be forbidden] to me, he hasto dissolve. There is a difference because it is a benefit for him and her. He should not be able to force his slave! There is a difference, “because his God’s crown is on his head²⁹Num. 6:7.,” a person who has no other master. This excludes the slave who has another master³⁰The master has the power to force the slave to disregard the vow. The slave in obeying his master does not commit any sin.. If he comes to protest his master’s word, one says to him: this is practice³¹He has to follow his master’s command., obey your master’s orders! If his master pushed him and he became impure, does he have to bring a sacrifice of impurity? Is he a nazir, did not you decide for him that he should become impure³²If his master’s action invalidates the slave’s vow, there is no valid vow of nazir. The status of the slave reverts to profane; the slave is not responsible for the lifting of the status of nazir from him. If there were anything sinful in this action, it would be the master’s responsibility.? You say, he brings a sacrifice of impurity; could he bring here a sacrifice of impurity? Does he annul? Is he a nazir, did not you decide for him that he should become impure? You say, he annuls; could he here annul³³Argument and meaning are completely parallel to the preceding.?

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman¹⁹Deut.22:13, “If a man takes a wife”.. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.²⁰The same formula as for qiddushin; Babli 52a, Tosephta 1:1 (the latter also has the formula for “bespeaking” by document).”

“From today and after 30 days.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply to her⁵⁰This refers to the case where a sequence of men said: “from now and after 30 days,” cf. Note 3. In this case, she is married to none of them completely; cf. Yebamot 3:5, Notes 102–105 (5:1, end; Nedarim 10:6 Note 59); Babli 60a.. Rebbi Eleazar said, it was necessary [to state], even if the second preliminarily married her absolutely⁵¹The interpretation of R. Abbahu is not the only one possible. Since the Mishnah mentions the condition “from now and after 30 days” only for the first man, it is quite possible that the second marries her unconditionally. Then no other man can join the list of suitors but nevertheless the woman is still “married and not married”.. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebele asked before Rebbi Eleazar: As you take it⁵²מַה נַפְשֵׁךְ is a technical term implying that a certain conclusion follows from two mutually exclusive premises.; what the first acquired, he acquired; the remainder the second finished⁵³This elliptic statement can be explained as follows (R. Moses Margalit): If the statement of the first groom, “from today and after 30 days”, means that he requires 30 days to make up his mind and might annul the preliminary marriage, then it is obvious that the second contracted a valid marriage and the first is eliminated. But if “from today and after 30 days” means that he wants to be married now but his obligations start only after 30 days, the first acquired the right to preliminarily marry the woman after 30 days. If now the second man marries her unconditionally within the thirty days, which the first cannot hinder, his acquisition should have eliminated the option which the first had acquired.. He answered, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions⁵⁴Incest and adultery prohibitions are so serious that no kind of intellectual acrobatics is applicable to them.? How is that? To any woman who is not acquired by one man only, even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply.

HALAKHAH: “A woman who had made a vow of nazir,” etc. Does this mean it became holy by dedication⁷³Since in the absence of a contract to the opposite, all property of the wife’s is administered by her husband, how can the wife dedicate animals for her sacrifices without asking her husband to do it for her?? But if a third person gave her a gift and said, on condition that your husband have no right of disposition over it⁷⁴This is one scenario in which the husband has no say in what she does. (Cf. Nedarim 11:8, Notes 69–70; Babli 24b.), then it is hers. Rebbi Mattaniah said, if he gave her power over his properties⁷⁵The husband gives her the right to sign for everything concerning their properties. In this case, she is able to dedicate the animals but he retains veto power. In the scenario described in Note 63, he has no veto power.. If he comes to protest, it did not become holy; otherwise, it became holy.

Rebbi Yudan asked: If somebody gave qiddushin to a woman “from now and after thirty days”¹⁰²Mishnah Qiddušin 3:1. If somebody gives something of value to a woman and says, “be betrothed to me after thirty days”, if another man comes in the meantime and gives her qiddushin, she is the wife of the second man and after 30 days, when she should become the wife of the first, she already is married and betrothal with a married man is void. But if the first had said, “from now after thirty days”, he reserved his rights to her from the moment of the transaction but she becomes his wife in civil and criminal law only after 30 days. If anybody else gives her qiddushin in that period, she is tentatively betrothed to both of them and both have to divorce her. and her sister became a candidate for levirate with him during these thirty days, is even in this “his wife with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”¹⁰³Following the House of Shammai.? He said, the House of Shammai said that only after candidacy and “bespeaking”. But that what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddushin are valid for her¹⁰⁴Babli Qiddušin 60a, Yerushalmi Qiddušin fol. 63c, 3:1. It is a little difficult to accomodate 100 qiddushin. The general idea is that the first man says, from now in 30 days, the next day another says, from now in 29 days, etc., does not follow the House of Shammai¹⁰⁵Since the House of Shammai hold that “bespeaking”, which is a very weak imitation of qiddushin, suffices to make the woman a wife in relation to female competitors, they should hold that qiddushin “from now to 30 days” also are enough to eliminate male competitors..

HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property¹⁰⁵Rebbi Meïr holds that a man means what he says (Nazir 2:1, 51d 1. 16; Babli Arakhin 5a). Since he must agree with R. Joḥanan the Alexandrian and everybody else that nobody can dedicate anything that is not under his control, he will interpret the husband’s vow not that he dedicates the future earnings of his wife but he dedicates her hands for what they will produce in the future. Since the hands do exist and the wife is required to work for him, the vow is valid.. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property¹⁰⁶Nobody can dedicate anything that is not under his control; the husband can appropriate his wife’s work for himself as profane property.. ¹⁰⁷The following text is from Nedarim 11:4, Notes 50–53. In the Babli, 57b, different but similarly sounding explanations are given in the names of the Babylonians Rav and Samuel. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs⁵¹Since a woman divorced after the definitive marriage but before sexual relations can claim only a ketubah of a mina, it is at the end. But since she still is a virgin, it is the beginning. The definition of R. Ze‘ira leads to the construction of a self-contradictory case; it should be rejected., as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated.¹⁰⁸End of the parallel in Nedarim. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there¹⁰⁹In Babylonia. The baraita is not in the Babli. supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield¹¹⁰In the absence of a written contract to the contrary, the husband is the administrator of the wife’s property; he is paid for his efforts by the cash yield of the property (Mishnah 6:1). Therefore, while he has no property rights to his wife’s excess earnings, by the ketubah he has a contractual interest in the increase of property generated by these earnings since such an increase could increase the cash yield which will be his. Therefore, he should be an interested party and his vow should be recognized by both R. Meïr and R. Joḥanan the Alexandrian without restrictions. This argument is too far-fetched to merit an answer.?