פירוש על ערכין 8:9

המקדיש. בשעה שאינה יובל – at the time when the Jubilee [year] is not in force/being observed.

Introduction Our mishnah begins to deal with the laws of consecrating one’s inherited field at a time when the Jubilee was no longer observed. The mishnah describes a time when the Temple is still standing, meaning that the law of the Jubilee was not observed during the Second Temple period.

פתח אתה ראשון – with how much [money] do you want to redeem it. And because of ample provision/ gain [for redemption of the field when Jubilee is not in force] for something dedicated/sanctified to the Temple, they ask him first and the owners add an additional fifth. And for this reason, it (i.e., the Mishnah) took the language of: “when the Jubilee is not in force,” for at the time when the Jubilee is in force, there is no need to ask him for how much he will redeem it, for its monetary values are determined: a Bet Kor (i.e., an area requiring a Kor of seed) for fifty shekel. But at the time when the Jubilee is not in force, such as after the tribe(s) of Reuven and Gad were exiled, they eliminated the Jubilee years as it is written (Leviticus 25:10): “you shall proclaim release throughout the land for all of its inhabitants,” at a time when all of its inhabitants are upon it (i.e., the land), but not at a time when they were exiled from its midst, for then it is redeemed at its worth.

If one consecrated his field at a time when the [law of the] Jubilee was no longer observed, they say to him: “You open [the bidding]!” because the owner must pay an added fifth, whereas others do not pay an additional fifth. When the Jubilee was no longer observed, a consecrated field was redeemed through an auction. The first bidder was always the original owner and if he did not want to redeem the Temple officials would force him to make at least a minimum bid. The preference for redeeming the field goes to the owner because when he redeems the field he adds an extra fifth. In contrast, when the Jubilee year was still observed, they didn’t force the owner to redeem his field because an unredeemed field eventually would belong to the priests.

שהבעלים נותנים את החומש – all the monies of its worth and one-fourth more. And Similarly, every “added fifth” that is mentioned in the Torah, it would be the principal and its added fifth part. But because of three things, we state to the owners: “You open/declare first,” one of them is that the owners add the fifth, as is taught in our Mishnah. And the second is that the commandment of redemption is with the master, as it is written (Leviticus 27:27): “if it is not redeemed, [it shall be sold at its assessment],” so we see that the commandment of redemption precedes that of selling (see Tractate Arakhin 27a). And the third is that he adds and gives for its redemption more than other people, for a person desires his measure of capacity, one sixth of a Se’ah.

It happened that one consecrated his field because it was bad. They said to him: “You open the bidding.” He said: “I will acquire it for an issar.” Rabbi Yose said: he did say that, but rather “for an egg,” because consecrated objects may be redeemed by either money or money's equivalent. He [the Temple treasurer] said to him: It’s yours. It turns out he lost an issar and the field was his again. In this somewhat amusing story, an owner of a field consecrates a field because due to its poor quality. They then force him to at least put forth a bid. His bid is extremely low, an issar, which is 1/24 of a dinar. Rabbi Yose says that he offered an egg for the field, an object probably worth about an issar, if not more. In any case, with this tiny bid, he has acquired his field. He loses the issar to the Temple, but the field is restored to his possession.

איסר – eight pennies.

לא אמר זה אלא כביצה – that is to say, this was not what actually happened, for he didn’t say, “for an Issar,” but rather, “with an egg.” And the treasurer said to him: “It’s yours; it is yours for an egg.” But there is a dispute of the first Tanna/teacher and Rabbi Yossi, as the Rabbis hold that we don’t redeem something dedicated [to the Temple] for less than four pennies, in order that the added fifth will [also] be a penny. But Rabbi Yossi holds, we redeem something dedicated [to the Temple] for anything, and even though its added fifth is not worth the equivalent of a penny. But the Halakha is according to the first Tanna/teacher.

ממשכנין מנכסיו עד עשר וכו' (they exact a surety from his property for ten) – and these words are when they retracted one after the other. But if they retracted all of them together, they divide in thirds between them equally. How so. If the first said: “This is mine for ten,” and the second said: “[this is mine] for twenty” and the third said:” [this is mine] for twenty-four, and the second and third [individuals] retracted as one, they give it to the first [individual] for ten, and exact a surety from the property of the second for seven and from the property of the third for seven, and it is found, that what is given in dedication to the Temple collects twenty four. And similarly, if all three of them retracted as one (i.e., at the same time), and the object was sold from that which was dedicated to the Temple to all three, they exact a surety from the properties of each one of the three [individuals] seven Sela. And such is the manner forever.

If one said: I will acquire it for ten selas, and another, [for] twenty, and another for thirty, and another for forty, and another for fifty, If he [that bid] fifty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he [that bid] forty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he [that bid] thirty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he that bid twenty reneged they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he that bid ten reneged they sell [the field] for what it is worth, and collect what remains from him who bid ten.
In this imaginative scenario there is initially a bidding war for the field, each person upping the previous bid by ten selas. Finally, the bid is won by the person who bid 50 selas. Then all of the bidders begin to renege. The mishnah delineates how the Temple deals with this situation. Note—the idea is that the Temple should collect the highest bid, but that all of those who bid should have to pay something. Basically the Temple takes a pledge from each person equivalent to the amount that he upped the previous bid ten selas. When they get to the last person, they simply sell the field and then take from him the difference between ten and the sale price. In this way, the Temple collects fifty selas, but no more than fifty selas.

If the owner bid twenty and any other man bid twenty, then the owner comes first, because he must add one fifth.
If the owner and another person put forth the same bid, the owner's bid is accepted because he must add an extra fifth. In this way the Temple maximizes its profits.

אמר אחד הרי היא שלי בעשרים ואחת – after the owners stated: “for twenty.”

Introduction
This mishnah deals with a case where the owner of the field is slightly outbid by another. The complicating factor is that the owner has to add an extra fifth, thereby increasing the profit gained by the Temple. Sometimes, a lower bid by the owner is actually better for the Temple than a higher bid by others.
The added fifth in rabbinic law is calculated by being a fifth of the final amount. Thus an added fifth of twenty is five, because 1/5 of 25 is five. If I remember my algebra the equation for this would be: x=(y+x)/5, where x is the added fifth and y is the original bid. This is called in rabbinic terminology, an outside fifth.

הבעלים נותנים – against their will twenty six, that to that one, they don’t give it to him, for since the owners said, “for twenty”, and the praise rose with the added fifth to twenty-five, but if they give it to him to this one “for twenty-one,” and it is found that it is dedicated to the Temple, he loses [money]. But the owners, against their will give that Selah that this one added to the principle and their twenty five, but on the Selah that this one adds, they do not add the added fifth.

If one said I will acquire it for twenty-one selas, then the owners must pay twenty-six. [If one said] Twenty-two, the owners must pay twenty-seven. Twenty-three, the owners must pay twenty-eight. Twenty-four, the owners must pay twenty-nine. Twenty-five, the owners must pay thirty, For they need not add one fifth to what the other bids more.
In all of these cases the owner bid twenty. If the other person bid 21, then the owner's bid of 20 will end up more profitable for the Temple, because it is actually 25. He must pay 26 because we can't allow the principal that he pays to be less than that of the other bidder. So of the 26 he pays, 21 is considered principal and 5 is the extra fifth. Note that the owner is forced to pay the extra sela, even though his original bid would have caused him to pay only 25. The same is true in cases where others bid 22-25—the owners add the fifth to their bid, taking them to 25, and then they add the number that by which the other's bid was greater than theirs.
The final line of this section explains that the owners don’t have to pay an added fifth for the extra amount that they pay to surpass the other's bid. In other words, their principal, upon which they pay the added fifth, remains 20. This is because the other bid did not surpass their bid and the added fifth.

אמר אחד בחמשה ועשרים הבעלים נותנים שלשים – against their will. But in the Gemara (Tractate Arakhin 27b) an objection is raised: Why do they force the owners? It is all right that until now, we obligate them for we are not able to give to this, for their principal is not like the principal and added fifth that the owners stated in the first clause [of the Mishnah], therefore, by force, we return it to the owners, and since we return it to them, we need to give the principal the way others estimated it and their added fifth. But now that one person said: “for twenty-five,” it should be given to that one, for their principal is like the principal plus the added fifth that the owners stated in the first clause, and let the owners say: “another comes in our place that wants to give twenty-five like us.” And he responds, as for example, that in the first clause, the owners say: “one penny more on the twenty-five Sela,” that their calculation of twenty-five and an added fifth arrives at the twenty-fiv and an penny, but if we give it to this one, there is a loss to the Sanctuary. Therefore, we return it to the owners against their will. But that it is not taught [in the Mishnah’s] first clause: “the owners say for twenty and a penny,” for regarding the pennies the Tanna/teacher [of the Mishnah] was not exact and he did not consider to teach it to them.

If one said: I will acquire it for twenty-six, if the owners want to pay thirty-one and an extra denar, the owner comes first. And if not, we say to the other: It has become yours.
In this case, the other bid was higher than the owner's bid and the added fifth taken together. In order to beat the other bid the owner will need to pay thirty-one selas and one denar. This consists of the original twenty five of their own bid (20 +5). Then they need to pay an extra six selas to add up to the twenty-six the other guy bid. For the extra sela which they were outbid they need to pay an added fifth, because in this case the extra amount bid was higher than his bid. This added fifth is one denar, because a sela is four denars. So it turns out that the owner pays 31 selas and one denar.
In this case the owner has the option to not pay the higher amount and allow the field to go to the other bidder.

אם רצו הבעלים ליתן שלשים ואחד ודינר – as for example, that from the outset when the owners opened first [in bidding], they said: ‘for twenty-one Sela,” which is between the principal and the added fifth of twenty-six Sela and a Denar, for the Sela is four Denarim and the added fifth is one-quarter of the money as we have stated, and the valuation of this are five, which is thirty-one and a Denar.

הבעלים קודמין – for if we would give him this, he would cause a loss to the Sanctuary of a Denar from was stated by the owners in the first clause [of the Mishnah], therefore, we return them to the owners against their will.

ואם לאו – if the owners did not open first other than with twenty and, and this one (i.e., the potential buyer) states: “twenty-five.”

אומרים לזה הגיעתך – this is surely yours, and we don’t return it to the owners. Because the owners state: “Another came in our place that gives twenty five like us.” But it is taught in our Mishnah that the owners do not add a fifth other than if they opened first, and not on the valuation of that [other] person, these words apply where people did not make an estimation of he land like this other person stated, but if three people make an estimated it according to the words of that of, the owners add an increased fifth of valuation against their will. But all of our Mishnah does not speak other than with ancestral field when the Jubilee is no longer in force, as it is taught at the beginning of the chapter (Mishnah 1).

מחרים אדם מצאנו – from part of his sheep. He says: Behold, they are property set apart for the priest’s use,” and he gives them to the Kohen.

Introduction The remainder of chapter eight deals with Leviticus 27:28: “But of all that anyone owns, be it man or beast or land of his holding, nothing that he has proscribed for the Lord may be sold or redeemed; every proscribed thing is totally consecrated to the Lord.” From this verse we see that a person can devote part of his property to God. The word for “proscribed” is “herem.” According to the Torah, when a person “proscribes” any of his property to God it cannot be sold or redeemed. Rather it permanently becomes the property of the priests (see below in mishnah six).

ואם החרים את כולן – that he did not leave for himself anything.

A man may proscribe [part] of his flock or of his herd, of his Canaanite slaves or female slaves or of his field of possession. But if he proscribed all of them, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. A person can proscribe some of a certain type of possession. For instance, he can proscribe some of his flock, herd or slaves. But he cannot proscribe all of them, and if he tries to do so, they are not considered to be sacred. This halakhah may come from a midrash on the words “of all that anyone owns” and not “all that anyone owns.” The implication is that one cannot proscribe all of his property and not even all of any one type of property.

אינן מוחרמין – as it states in Scripture (Leviticus 27:28): “But of all that anyone owns, [be it man or beast or land of his holding, nothing that he has proscribed for the LORD may be sold or redeemed],” and from his ancestral land. "מכל אשר לו"/"but of all [that anyone] owns", these are the movable properties, but not all the movables." "מאדם/anyone – these are the his slaves and Canaanite maidservants, but not all of them. "משדה אחוזתו"/”from land of his holding” – but not all of it. But the Halakah is not according to Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah, but rather, ab initio, one should not dedicate all of it for priest’s or sacred use, but if he did dedicate it, the are considered dedicated for priestly and/or sacred use.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah said: just as when it comes to the Highest One, one is not permitted to proscribe all of his possessions, how much more so should one be careful with his property. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah learns a moral lesson from the previous halakhah. One is not allowed to dedicate all of a certain type of property to the Temple, because that would be too great of a loss to his estate. The Torah prevents a person from acting so rashly when it comes to his own property even though the designee of this proscription is God what could be better than that! From here we can draw the lesson that people should be careful not to lose their property, a lesson that we might heartily agree with, even after two thousand years. Indeed, to this day, when a person gives a large percentage of his property to charity, he is praised, but if he gives all of it away, leaving himself with nothing to live on, he is probably considered foolish.

להיות חס על מכסיו – that he will not squander/give them away to a non-Kohen.

שאין אדם מחרים דבר שאינו שלו – for his daughter, assuming that he can sell her while she is a minor, he is not able to sell her when she is a young woman.

If one proscribes his son or his daughter, or his Hebrew slave or female slave, or the field which he acquired by purchase, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, for one can proscribe something that does not belong to him. One can proscribe only things that belong to him as permanent possessions. This is stated quite clearly in Leviticus 27:28, “But of all that anyone owns, be it man or beast or land of his holding.” Thus one cannot proscribe his children, his Hebrew slaves (whom he does not own) or land which he acquired through purchase. Such land will revert to its original owners when the Jubilee year comes, so it doesn’t really belong to its current owner.

שהחרמים שלהם – as it is written (Numbers 18:14): “ Everything that has been proscribed in Israel shall be yours (see Leviticus 27:28 as well),” and since it is his (i.e., the Kohen’s) what benefit would there with this if he would devote it to priestly or sacred use, he himself has possession of it and he does not give it to another Kohen.

Priests and Levites cannot proscribe [their belongings], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: the priests cannot proscribe, because things proscribed belong to them. But Levites can proscribe, because things proscribed do not belong to them. As we stated in the introduction, when someone proscribes (he uses the language, herem) his property, he is giving it to the priests. Therefore, if priests proscribe their property, nothing happens to it. According to Rabbi Judah, Levites too cannot proscribe their property. Rabbi Shimon holds that while priests cannot proscribe, Levites can, because the property they proscribe does not become theirs, but rather the priets.

נראין דברי ר' יהודה (it appears that the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is correct) – this is what he said: the words of Rabbi Yehuda appear correct to Rabbi Shimon, for Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rabbi Yehuda and holds like him regarding land/real estate. But Rabbi Shimon did not speak other than about movables, because the Levites do not have things that are devoted to priestly or sacred use. But Rabbi Yehuda holds that an analogy was made between movable things to an ancestral field, as it is written (Leviticus 27:28): “but of all that anyone owns, be it man or beast of land of his holding,” just as ancestral land the Levities do not devote to the Kohen or to sacred use, as it is written (Leviticus 25:34): “[But the unenclosed land about their cities cannot be sold,] for that is their holding for all time,” even movable properties, the Levities cannot devote to priestly or sacred use. But Rabbi Shimon does not make this analogy and since Rabbi [Judah the Prince] goes down to explain the matter of Rabbi Shimon in what he agrees with Rabbi Yehuda and in what he disputes him. We learn from it the Halakha is according to Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi says: the words of Rabbi Judah seem acceptable in cases of immovable property as it is said: “For that is their perpetual possession,” (Leviticus 25:34) and the words of Rabbi Shimon seem acceptable in cases of movable property, since things proscribed do not fall to them. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] functions in this mishnah as a halakhic decisor in the debate between Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon concerning whether Levites can proscribe their property. Rabbi agrees that when it comes to immovable property, i.e. land, a Levite cannot proscribe his property. This is because states that the land that the Levites own is their “perpetual possession.” If they were allowed to proscribe their land, they could lose it. Therefore, they cannot proscribe any of their land. However, when it comes to movable property (animals, possessions, etc.) they can proscribe it, as Rabbi Shimon stated. This is because they don’t have the complication that priests have that the proscribed property would become theirs.

חרמי כהנים – property set aside for priestly use that was dedicated to the priests in order to give it to the Kohanim.

Introduction In today’s mishnah the sages and Rabbi Judah ben Batera disagree as to whether things that are proscribed without specification go to the priests or to a fund for Temple repairs. We should note that the first says, “every proscribed thing is totally consecrated to the Lord.” The meaning of “to the Lord” is disputed in our mishnah.

אין להם פדיון – as it is written (Leviticus 27:28): “[nothing that he has proscribed to the LORD] may be sold or redeemed.” But that which is set aside for the repair of the Temple does have redemption, for it is with this intention that it was set aside, but this is not appropriate for the repair of the Temple other than money.

Things proscribed for [the use of] the priests cannot be redeemed but are to be given to the priests. That things proscribed cannot be redeemed is stated explicitly in the Torah, “nothing that he has proscribed for the Lord may be sold or redeemed.” According to this opinion, the proscribed things become the property of the priests. The source of this can be found in section three below.

וחכמים אומרים סתם חרמים לכהנים (without further explanation) – and the Halakha is according to the Sages. But those who set aside movables at this time, and similarly those who set aside for priestly use land outside of the Land of Israel that their law is like that of movables in this matter, they give to the Priests. Ut he who sets aside things for the repair of the Temple in this time when there is no Temple redeems them ab initio for a small amount. And ab initio, he should not give less than four Zuzim or something near to this, but not the equivalent to a penny alone or something like this, for there is no publicity to the matter.

Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: things proscribed without specification fall to [the fund for] Temple repairs, as it was said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:25). Rabbi Judah ben Batera and the sages argue over whether things that are proscribed without specification, meaning the person did not state where he wanted the things to go, are given to the fund for Temple repair or to the priests. According to Rabbi Judah ben Batera, they are given to Temple repair. This is the meaning of “most holy to the Lord.”

שהוא חל על קדשי קדשים – as will be explained further on (see Mishnah 7), “a person dedicates to the priest or to sacred purposes the things he declares holy.”

But the sages say: things proscribed without specification go to the priests, as it is said: “As a field proscribed: its possession belongs to the priest” (Leviticus 27:21). If so, why is it said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord”? This teaches that it applies to most holy and less holy things. The other sages point out that Leviticus 27:21 (and Numbers 18:14) clearly state that proscribed things belong to the priests. This then causes them to ask why the Torah says, “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord.” They interpret this verse as if it says, “Every proscribed thing, even a most holy thing, is holy to the Lord.” The next mishnah will discuss this halakhah.

ואם נדר – if he said: “this burnt-offering will be upon me,” and he separated an animal for his vow and afterwards dedicated it to sacred purposes, but since he is liable for its guarantee/surety (i.e., property which may be resorted to in the event of non-payment) if it (i.e., the animal) died or was stolen, and it is found that it is, and he gives all of its monetary value to the Kohen, but he will offer the animal up as a sacrifice in fulfillment of his vow, for this certainly has redemption.

A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things.
If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him.
[If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer].
A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister.
Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
Today’s mishnah explains how one proscribes something that is already holy.
Section one: As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, a person can proscribe his most holy things (such as an olah a whole burnt offering) or his less holy things (such as a shelamim a wellbeing offering). Our mishnah describes what happens when he does after all, if something is already sanctified, how can he proscribe it either to the priests or for the upkeep of the Temple?
Section two: There are two ways of consecrating something: 1) as a vow; 2) as a freewill offering. Consecrating something as a vow means that he said, “I vow to bring an olah or a shelamim.” Then he sets aside an animal to be the olah or shelamim (a burnt offering and an offering of wellbeing). In this case, if something should happen to the animal he would have to bring another in its stead in order to fulfill his vow. He then proscribes this animal. In this case, since he was responsible for the animal, he can proscribe its entire value. This value must be given either to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
Section three: The other way of consecrating something is by saying, “This animal will be an olah or a shelamim.” In this case, if something should happen to the animal, he is not responsible to bring another in its stead. Thus the animal was not worth to him its full value (as it was in the previous case) because if it gets lost or dies, he need not bring another. We now have to evaluate how much it was worth to him. There are two ways of understanding how this is done. The first is that we evaluate how much a person would pay to offer an olah when he is not obligated to do so. A person might feel some pleasure from bringing a sacrifice and we could even give a monetary amount to this benefit. This is the amount that he would have to pay to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
The other interpretation of this section is that we find how much a priest who is not currently on his watch at the Temple would pay a person to wait until his watch to bring his olah so that he could have the benefit of offering it up. This amount of money is what the person who proscribed the animal would be obligated to give to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
Section four: A person can proscribe a first born animal, whether it is blemished (and edible to its owner) or unblemished (and must be given to the priest). The mishnah now explains how we evaluate how much the one who proscribed the first-born owes in a case where he was obligated to give it to a priest (an unblemished animal.) This animal cannot be given to a priest in return for money. But he could give it to his daughter’s son, if his daughter married a priest or to his nephew if his sister married a priest. We estimate how much a person would pay to give such a gift to his nephew or grandson and that is the amount he owes.
Rabbi Ishmael now provides a midrash to prove that one can dedicate a first born so that its value goes to the Temple or to the priests but one cannot dedicate a first-born for it to become a sacrifice. He points out that in reference to the first born one verse says, “you shall dedicate” and another verse says, “you shall not consecrate.” These two verses seemingly disagree with one another. He resolves them by having them refer to our situation you can dedicate the first born so that its value goes to the priests, but you cannot dedicate a first born so that it is put onto the altar as a different type of sacrifice.

ואם נקבה היא – that he is not liable for its surety if it died, property set apart for the priest or sacred use do not take effect, for it is not his, but rather incidentally, its worth. And the worth that it has for him he gives to the Kohen. How so? “This bull will be a burnt-offering,” and he dedicated it to the priests or for sacred purposes, they estimate how much a person who is not liable for a burnt-offering wants to give if he would find a burnt-offering cheaply in order to offer a sacrificial gift to his Creator, and equivalent to those monies, he gives that, for this is the satisfaction that he feels in obligating someone with it. For if it had died or was stolen, he is not liable for the surety, and when he separated it [for this purpose], he had fulfilled its obligation, but from now, he does not destroy nor lose anything other than the fact that he did not offer a sacrificial gift to His creator.

שאין רשאי – that he is not obligated for [a burnt-offering]. The Aramaic translation of נושה/ (see Psalms 109: 11: “May his creditor/נושה seize all his possessions”) is רשיא /pressing creditor.

כיצד פודין אותו – that regarding the firstling, its body is not dedicated to the priest or to sacred purposes, for it is not his but rather belongs to the Kohen. But rather, they estimate, how much a person would wish to give to the owner when he gives his first-born animal to the son of his daughter who is a Kohen or to the son of his sister. And that worth is what he gives, that this owner will give It to the Kohen for the property set apart for the use by the Kohen or for Temple use. And especially, it (i.e., the Mishnah) took the words, “the son of his daughter or the son of his sister, who is a Kohen,” for whereas it was the Kohen himself, he would not be able to give the satisfaction one feels in obligating someone to the owner in order that he should give the firstling to him or to another Kohen, for since the firstling is fit for him, he appears like a Kohen who is assisting in the granary to thresh and to winnow in order that they will give him heave-offerings as his salary, and it is found that he does not take it according to the law of heave-offerings, but rather according to law of salary [as payment for labor performed].

כתוב אחד אומר תקדיש – regarding the firstling, it is written (Deuteronomy 15:19): “You shall consecrate [to the LORD your God] all male firstlings that are born [in your herd and in our flock: you must not work your firstling ox or shear your firstling sheep].”

וכתוב אחד אומר אל תקדיש –(Leviticus 27:26): “A firstling of animals, however, -which -as a firstling – is the LORD’s, cannot be consecrated by anybody; [whether ox or sheep, it is the LORD’s].”

הקדש עילוי (consecration by valuation: a pledge made to consecrate an article that is already sacred; a person is obligated to pay the amount one would be willing to pay to sacrifice that offering – but not necessarily the full value of the offering) – to offer up in money that he would give for the satisfaction one feels in obligating someone how much [money] that a person wishes to give to offer up a burnt-offering that he is not obligated for but rather in order to make a gift to his Creator.

ואי אתה מקדישו הקדש מזבח – that there will be there another [sacrifice] that will rest upon him. But the Rabbis who derive for them this exposition above (see Tractate Arakhin, Chapter 8, Mishnah 6): “from everything that is devoted to the priests or to sacred purposes are the most holy things,” [the words] "אל תקדיש" /”You will not sanctify” (Leviticus 27:26) is required for them as a negative commandment, for if one seizes it for the purposes of another sacrifices, he is violating a negative commandment, and [the word] "תקדיש"/”You shall sanctify” (Deuteronomy 15:19) they require to state that it is a commandment to sanctify it and to state this is holy for a first-born, and even though that of its own it is holy. But Rabbi Yishmael does not hold by this exposition. And the Halakha is according to the Sages.