Commentaire sur Shevi'it 10:13

שביעית משמטת את המלוה – A person who loans his fellow and the Seventh Yeaer passed upon him after the loan [was made], he cannot claim [repayment of] his loan from his fellow, as it is written (Deuteronomy 15:2): “every creditor shall remit the due that he claims from his fellow.”

Introduction The final chapter of Sheviit is concerned with the remission of loans. Deuteronomy 15:2-3 states, “Every seventh year you shall practice remission of debts. This shall be the nature of the remission: every creditor shall remit the due that he claims from his fellow; he shall not dun his fellow or kinsman, for the remission proclaimed is of the LORD. You may dun the foreigner; but you must remit whatever is due you from your kinsmen.” Our chapter discusses what types of loans are remitted, when they are remitted and other technical aspects of the remission of loans at the end of the seventh year. Most importantly, mishnah three will discuss the prozbul, a document instituted by Hillel the Elder which prevents loans from being cancelled. We will discuss the prozbul when we get to that mishnah.

בשטר – that he wrote for him a document [for which] an obligation for which property is pledged and he mortgaged land upon the lender that looks like he who deposits as surety lands with him, nevertheless, the Seventh Year cancels it (i.e., the loan).

The sabbatical year cancels a debt written in a document or one not written in a document. The seventh year cancels all “loans” whether those loans were secured with a document or not. This is derived from the words, “every creditor shall remit the due that he claims from his fellow.”

שקנה ממנו באמנה – that he bought from him in good faith.

A debt to a shop is not cancelled, but if it had been converted into the form of a loan, then it is cancelled. Rabbi Judah says: the former debt is always cancelled. If a person opens an account with his store, that debt is not remitted because it is not considered a loan. The rabbis look at this as if every day is the time when he should pay back the debt, and hence it is not a loan. However, if the storekeeper turns it into an official loan, for instance if he says something like, “You have until such and such a time to pay me back the money you owe me” then the debt is remitted in the seventh year. Rabbi Judah has a more nuanced view of when a debt to a store becomes a “loan.” The first time someone buys something from a shop without paying the debt is not a loan. However, the second time he does so, the prior debt turns automatically into a loan. Since it is a loan, the seventh year will cancel the debt. The same will happen every time he subsequently buys without paying each time the former debt turns into a loan and is therefore affected by the sabbatical year.

A wage-debt to a worker is not cancelled, but if it had been converted into a loan it is cancelled. Rabbi Yose says: the [payment for] any work that must cease with the seventh year, is cancelled, but if it need not cease with the seventh year, then it is not cancelled. Similar to a debt to a shop, wages owed to a worker are not considered a loan but a “debt.” However, once the worker turns this into a loan, the sabbatical year does cancel it out. Rabbi Yose says that whether or not the sabbatical year cancels the debt to the worker depends on whether the work can continue to be done on the seventh year. If the work cannot be done in the seventh year, then the debt to the worker automatically becomes a loan because the working arrangement has to stop. However, if the work can continue to be done during the seventh year, for instance the worker was not working in the field, then the debt remains a debt and not a loan because the work could potentially continue.

ואם עשאה מלוה – that he intended [this] with the purchaser and the creditor settles the interests on the debtor as a loan (the note stating the combined amount of principal and interest as principal).

הראשון משמט – if he purchased it in good faith the first time from the hstore, and he retracted and purchased it a second time, the first [purchase] is made into a loan and is cancelled, but not the second. If he retracted and purchased it a third time, the first and second are made into a loan and the Seventh Year cancels them, but not the third, and such is the case always. The last one (i.e. purchase), the Seventh Year does not cancel and all the others, the Seventh Year cancels them, for since it was appropriate for that he should give him the money of the first one prior to his purchasing the second debts for merchandise payable at certain seasons and he did not give it, the first one becomes a loan, and similarly at all times. But the Halalkha is not like Rabbi Yehuda.

כל מלאכה שפוסקת בשביעית – if he hired this man from labors that stop in the Seventh Year, meaning to say, from labors that are forbidden to perform them in the Seventh Year such as plowing and reaping and working the land, this salary is made like a loan in the Seventh Year, and the Seventh Year cancels it, and if not, that this payment that he is obliged to him was from the rest of the labors that are not forbidden in the Seventh Year, it is not made like a loan and the Seventh Year does not cancel it. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Yossi.

השוחט את הפרה – in the Seventh Year, and divided it [among the purchasers] on the first day of the two days of the holiday of Rosh Hashanah, if Elul was intercalated [by addin to it an additional day – thirty days], it is found that the first day that it (i.e., the cow) was divided, it was a weekday, and it was the last day of Elul of the Seventh Year, and the Seventh Year cancels [a debt] at its end, as it is written (Deuteronomy 15:1): “Every seventh year (literally, at the end of Seven Years) you shall practice remission of debts.”

Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss what types of debts are remitted at the end of the sabbatical year.

האונס והמפתה (see Deuteronomy 22:19) , that they give fifty Shekel [as a fine].

One who slaughters a cow and divides it up on Rosh Hashanah [at the end of the seventh year]: If the month had been intercalated, [the debt] is remitted. But if it had not been intercalated, it is not remitted. Debts are remitted only at the very end of the sabbatical year. Thus a loan taken out on the last day of the year will be remitted, but a loan taken out on the first day of the next year will not be remitted. What makes this more complicated is that Elul, the last month of the year can have either 29 or 30 days. That is to say that the 30th day after Rosh Hodesh Elul could either be the first day of the next year, Rosh Hashanah, or the last day of the previous year. Our mishnah describes a person who has slaughtered a cow and “registered” other people to receive parts of the cow. Once he divides up the meat and gives it to them they owe him the money, and our mishnah treats this like a loan. So if he divides up the meat on the 30th of Elul at the end of the sabbatical year, what our mishnah calls “Rosh Hashanah” because it could potentially be Rosh Hashanah, and then it turns out that they added a day to the month, thereby keeping that day part of the previous year, then the loan is remitted by the seventh year. However, if they decide that this day is Rosh Hashanah then the seventh year was over before the meat was divided up. Since the loan was incurred in the eighth year it is not remitted. What a difference a day makes!

והמוציא שם רע – that gives one hundred.[Shekel].

[Fines for] rape, for seduction, for defamation, and all other obligations arising from legal procedure, are not remitted. A rapist and a seducer pay a fine of 50 shekels (see Ketubot 3:4 and Exodus 22:16, and Deuteronomy 22:29). One who defames a virgin pays a fine of 100 shekels (Deuteronomy 22:19). These are not considered normal loans and hence the sabbatical year does not cause them to be remitted. Similarly, any amount of money that a court has ordered a person to pay for whatever reason, that debt is not remitted on the sabbatical year. These are not considered “loans” but rather “debts.”

וכל מעשה בית דן – money that they wrote upon it a religious decision, you are obligated to give it to him.

One who loans and takes a pledge, and one who hands over his debt documents to a court, [these debts] are not remitted. There are two types of situations discussed here. The first is a person who loans someone money and in return takes a pledge, an object of some value that he will return when the loan is repaid. Because he took a pledge the loan is not remitted. One reason for this may be that when he gets the money that he loaned back, it is as if he selling the pledge back to the debtor. The second situation is one who transfers his debts to the court so that the court will collect the debts on his behalf. He does this before the seventh year is over. The prohibition of collecting a debt after the seventh year falls on the individual creditor and not on the court. Thus the court can collect these debts on the creditor’s behalf without the debts being remitted by the seventh year. As we shall see in tomorrow’s mishnah, using this halakhah, Hillel invented away for people to avoid the remission of debts in the seventh year.

אין משמיטין – for since the Jewish court that made a religious decision regarding the money [is considered] as collected, and as if it reached his hand.

המלוה על המשכון – as it is written (Deuteronomy 15:3): “but you must remit whatever is due you” except for that “whatever is due you from your kinsman.”

והמוסר שטרותיו לב"ד – as it is written: “[but you must remit] whatever is due you from your kinsmen,” except for someone who hands over his bonds to a court [for collection] since the Jewish court has the obligation towards his brother.

פרוזבול אינו משמט – The word פרוז is an ordinance (for the public welfare) (see comment of Rav Hisda in Talmud Gittin 36b); the word בול is for the rich (and Rashi’s commentary at the top of Talmud Gittin 37a), as it written (Leviticus 26:19): “And I will break your proud glory. [I will make your skies like iron and your earth like copper].” And Rav Yosef (see Talmud GIttin 37a) stated that these are the cities in Judea. An ordinance was made for the rich that they would not transgress on [the verse] (Deuteronomy 15:9): “Beware lest your harbor the base thought, [‘The seventh year, the year of remission, is approaching’],” and there is an ordinance for the poor that they would find someone who will lend to them, for the cancelling of cash debts in the present time is Rabbinic, as it is written (Deuteronomy 15:2): “This shall be the nature of the remission: every creditor shall remit the due that he claims from his fellow…,” as the Biblical verse speaks of two remissions: one is the remission of land and one is the remission/cancellation of cash debts, for at the time when one remits/cancels land debts, you remit/cancel cash debts, and at the time when you don’t remit land debts, you don’t remit/cancel cash debts; and it is Rabbinic, for they ordained the cancellation of cash debts at this time, and because of this, there was power in the hand of Hillel to establish Prozbul to cancel/release the law of remission, for the cancellation of cash debts is none other than from the words of the Scribes.

[A loan secured by] a prozbul is not cancelled.
This was one of the things enacted by Hillel the elder; for when he observed people refraining from lending to one another, and thus transgressing what is written in the Torah, “Beware, lest you harbor the base thought, [‘The seventh year, the year of remission, is approaching,’ so that you are mean to your needy kinsman and give him nothing.”
Hillel enacted the prozbul.
This mishnah contains one of the most famous “takkanot” or pieces of halakhic legislation in the Mishnah. The takkanah is called the “prozbul” and was meant to be a way to prevent the sabbatical year from causing loans to be remitted. We shall see why Hillel made this takkanah inside the mishnah.
Section one: The prozbul was a document that a person would write before the seventh year and through it he would transfer his debts to the court. We shall learn more about how this document works in tomorrow’s mishnah. By using the prozbul document, a person’s could collect from his debtors after the seventh year.
Section two: At first it might seem that the prozbul would have been detrimental to the poor. After all, the sabbatical year was designed to give them relief from their debts by causing all loans to be remitted after the seventh year. However, the Torah already anticipated that this might cause lenders to be extremely hesitant about giving out loans. After all, these loans were an act of charity because they couldn’t charge interest. Hillel saw that the sabbatical year’s remission of loans would ultimately cause the poor to suffer by making loans unavailable to them. Therefore, in order to aid people in getting loans, he had to secure the creditor’s ability to be repaid hence he enacted the prozbul.

זהו גופו של פרוזבול – its essential principle and its root.

Introduction Today’s mishnah describes what was written in the prozbul, the document we began to discuss yesterday.

והדיינים חותמים למטה או העדים – For this purpose, it is taught “the judges or the witnesses” to teach you that a witness is able to become a judge or a judge [is able to become] a witness, for according to the Rabbis a witness becomes a judge, and Prozbul is a Rabbinical ordinance.

This is the formula of the prozbul: “I turn over to you, so-and-so, judges of such and such a place, that any debt that I may have outstanding, I shall collect it whenever I desire.” And the judges sign below, or the witnesses. Through the prozbul, a person would turn his debts over to a court so that the court would collect them in his place. As we learned in mishnah two, anyone who turns his debts over to a court does not have them remitted by the sabbatical year. So before the sabbatical year was over, the creditor would write out a document through which he would turn his debts over to the court. He would then have a right to collect them after the sabbatical year was over. This was the “legal fiction” through which Hillel prevented people from not loaning to the poor.

פרוזבול המקדם – that its time is early, that it was written in Kislev and the its time that is written within it is from the previous Tishrei, it is Kasher/fit, because the prerogative of the lender is impaired in this, for a Prozbul does not profit other than to loans from before it, for when they are transferred to the Jewish court, they are cancelled, it is found that they cause loss in what that its time had been advanced, but a postdated Prozbul is invalid, for he made the time later amd the je the borrower between them, and when he produces this Prozbul and the the Jewish court sees the time, they think that the loans preceded the Prozbul and it is found that he collects unlawfully

Introduction This mishnah deals with the dates that are written in the prozbul.

שארי חוב המוקדמים פסולים – as for example, that it refers to Nisan and he wrote in the document the time of the previous Tishrei, they are invalid because he collects unlawfully from the mortgaged property between Tishrei and Nisan, and te Rabbis fine im, that he should not collect at all with this document from the mortgaged property, and even from Nisan and beyond, as a decree lest he collect from them unlawfully between Tishrei and Nisan. But however, the document is not invalid on account of the witnesses that affixed their signatures to it who were wicked who signed the antedated document falsely, for the witnesses would be able to state that that we affixed our names on the essence of the loan and not on the time, and we did not come to testify that it was written and signed on that day.

A pre-dated prozbul is valid, but a post-dated one, is invalid. If a prozbul was written in the month of Tevet, but the date written in it was Cheshvan, which comes before Tevet, the prozbul is still valid. This is because a pre-dated prozbul will be to the detriment only of the creditor since the prozbul will be effective only for loans given out before the prozbul is written. However, if he post-dates the prozbul, i.e. he writes it in Cheshvan but dates it to Tevet, the prozbul is invalid because this is to the benefit of the creditor and to the detriment of the borrower.

והמאוחרים כשרים – because the lender’s prerogative has been weakened, that he doesn’t seize the sold property other from the time that is written in the document.

Pre-dated loan documents [of loans] are invalid, but post-dated one valid. The mishnah now contrasts the prozbul with the loan documents themselves. If one pre-dates a loan document then it is invalid. This is because a loan document creates a lien on the other person’s property and may cause a third party to lose out. For instance, Reuven loans money to Shimon and the loan actually takes place in Nissan but he dates the document to Tishrei. Because the document was dated to Tishrei, the lien will be placed on any property Shimon owned in Tishrei. Thus if Levi bought property between Tishrei and Nissan and Shimon defaults on his loan, Reuven can collect his debt from Levi, even though the loan actually occurred after Levi bought the property. In such a case, there was no lien on Shimon’s property when Levi acquired it, and Reuven’s seizure from Levi is illegal. Therefore, pre-dated loan documents are invalid. However, post-dated loan documents are valid because they are only to the detriment of the creditor. Since no one else will lose out, these documents are valid.

כותבין פרוזבול לכל חד ואחד – for each and every loan it is necessary that he will transmit his documents to the Jewish court and it will write him a Prozbul, therefore, like when five [people] borrow from one [person], it doesn’t write other than one Prozbul, for there is only one lender here, and even though that there are many borrowers, that when the lender will have one Prozbul on everything that is enough.

If one borrows from five persons, then he writes a separate prozbul for each [creditor]. But if five borrow from the same person, then he writes only one prozbul for them all. The prozbul is written for the creditor and not the borrower. Thus if one person borrows money from five different people, each creditor needs his own prozbul. However, if one person lends money to five different people, he needs only one prozbul in order to collect his debt after the seventh year.

אלא על הקרקע – unless the borrower has real-estate, for then, the liability is considered as collected in the hand of the Jewish court and we don’t don’t call him (Deuteronomy 15:2):”he shall not dun [his fellow or his kinsman].”

Introduction In order to write a prozbul over a debt, the debtor must have land. This is because the lien placed on the land by the debt makes it as if the debt has already been collected by the court at the point of the loan. Therefore when the creditor goes to collect the loan on behalf of the court through the use of the prozbul, it is as if he is collecting a loan that has already been collected. Thus this is not a violation of the prohibition of collecting a debt after the seventh year. Our mishnah teaches that this requirement can be in a sense “fictionalized” such that the debtor need not actually own land.

אם אין לו – if the borrower/debtor [lacks land], and the lender has [land], the creditor/lender transfers to him from his field a small piece and writes upon it a Prozbul, and even if the debt is one-hundred Maneh, because a small piece of land is worthy to collect through it all of his debt, as for example, regarding that he collects and then collects again until he completes all of his debt.

A prozbul is written only for [a debt secured by] land. As I explained in the introduction above, in order for a prozbul to be written, the borrower must have land.

היתה לו – if the borrower/debtor had a mortgaged field in the city, whether others had mortgaged it to him or whether he mortgaged it [as a security] to others, they write a Prozbul.

But if [the debtor] has none, then [the creditor] can give him title to a share, however small, of his own field. The requirement for the debtor to have land may have made receiving a loan difficult, which is again a problem for the poor who are in most need of loans. If a prozbul cannot be written over a loan, a lender may be hesitant about loaning money to someone who really needs it (for instance a sharecropper, who may not own the land and may need a loan to pay for seed). Therefore, the creditor is allowed to give title to a piece of his land to the borrower. This title can in actuality be a fiction, whereby the creditor gives him the smallest piece of land possible on his own property and then he can write a prozbul on as large of a debt as he wishes.

כותבין לאיש על נכסי אשתו – such as the land of the wife’s estate of which the husband has the fruition [without responsibility for loss or deterioration].

If he had land in pledge in a city, a prozbul can be written on it. If the debtor gave a piece of land as a pledge in order to secure another loan, the creditor may write a prozbul for a different loan, counting the pledged land as if it was actually still fully in the hands of the debtor. Again, we see that the rabbis are relaxing some of the requirements in order to make it easier for a person to write a prozbul so that he could take out a loan.

על נכסי אפוארופין – that they lend for the needs of the orphans as the orphans have no property.

Rabbi Hutzpit says: a prozbul may be written for a man on the security of his wife's property, or for an orphan on the security of property belonging to his guardian. Sometimes, a prozbul can be written for a person even though he does not actually own the property. For instance a man who does not own property but is married to a woman who does own property can have a prozbul written on the basis of his wife’s property. Similarly, orphans who don’t actually own property may have a prozbul written based on the property owned by their guardian.

כוורת דבורים וכו' – when it (i.e., the beehive) is attached with plaster, everyone admits that it is like land/real estate for all things, but if it was placed upon pegs, everyone admits that it is like utensils and is not like land/real estate; they did not dispute other than when it was lying on the ground and not attached with plaster.

Introduction In this mishnah the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer debate whether a beehive, resting on the ground, is considered to have the status of land. As we shall see, there are halakhic consequences to it either being considered land or not.

ר"א אומר הרי היא כקרקע – and like land/real estate, it is acquired with money, a document and a claim of undisturbed possession during a legally fixed period.

A bee-hive:
Rabbi Eliezer says: Behold, it is like land and a prozbul may be written [using it as security] and it is not susceptible to uncleanness while it remains in its place, and one who takes honey from it on Shabbat is liable. According to Rabbi Eliezer, the beehive has the status of land. The mishnah lists three consequences to this determination. 1) If the debtor owns a beehive, a prozbul may be written using just the beehive as security, even though he owns no actual land. This is a topic that we covered in yesterday’s mishnah. 2) Land and anything that is considered attached to it (such as plants or houses) is not susceptible to impurity. Thus, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the beehive cannot become impure. However, this is only true while it remains in its place. If the beehive was picked up and moved elsewhere, it can become susceptible to impurity. 3) One who plucks something from the land is liable for a Shabbat transgression. Hence, according to Rabbi Eliezer, one who removes honey from a beehive on Shabbat is liable.

וכותבין עליה פרוזבו – if the debtor/borrower has a beehive, it is like he had land/real estate.

But the sages say: it is not like land, a prozbul may not be written [using it as security], it is susceptible to uncleanness while in its place, and one who takes honey from it on Shabbat is exempt. The rabbis do not consider the beehive to be “land” and therefore, in all three of these halakhot, they rule opposite of Rabbi Eliezer.

ואינה מקבלת טומאה – in the manner that real estate is attached and is not susceptible to ritual uncleanness.

והרודה – from the honeycombs that are within it on Shabbat, he is liable for a sin-offering like someone who tears off something from the place where it is attached, as it is written (I Samuel 14:27): “And he (i.e., Jonathan) dipped it into the beehive of honey [and brought his hand back to his mouth and his eyes lit up],” bu what connection has he forest with the honey, but rather, just as the forest, he who plucks/detaches from it on the Sabbath is liable for a sin-offering, even honey that one removes [from the beehive] on the Sabbath is liable for a sin-offering. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Eliezer.

המחזיר חוב בשביעית – at the end of the Sseventh Year, which is its year of cancellation of debts, for the Seventh Year does not cause the release from debt other than at its end as it states (Deuteronomy 15;1): “Every seventh year (literally, at the end of the Seventh Year) [you practice remission of debts].”

Introduction This mishnah deals with the possibility that a debtor would pay back a loan after the seventh year has caused the loan to be remitted.

אמר לו אעפ"כ – the borrower/debtor says to him (i.e., the creditor/lender), even so/nevertheless, I want to repay you.”

One who returns a debt [after] the seventh year, the [creditor] must say to [the debtor]: “I remit it.” But [the debtor] should say: “Even so [I will repay it].” [The creditor] may then accept it from him, because it says: “And this is the word of the release” (Deuteronomy 15:2). If a debtor comes to a creditor to repay a loan after the seventh year has caused his loan to be remitted, the creditor must tell the debtor that he need not repay the loan. He cannot simply accept it from him without saying anything. However, once the creditor has said that he remits the loan, the debtor should say back to him, “Even so I will repay it.” The rabbis recognize that paying back a loan is a good thing and that a debtor who has the ability to pay back a loan should not use the seventh year as an excuse not to. Importantly, the mishnah notes that the creditor may accept his money back. It is prohibited for him to approach the borrower and demand repayment of the loan. But it is not prohibited for the creditor to accept the money back. This dialogue is derived midrashically from the words, “This is the word of the release,” which we would usually translate at “This is the matter of the release.” The Hebrew word for “matter” and “word” are the same. The rabbis derive from this phrase that it is sufficient for the creditor to say that the loan is remitted. By saying such words, he fulfills his duty and if the borrower still wishes to repay the loan, the creditor may accept it from him.

יקבל ממנו – is that all? But rather, he is permitted to say to him, that his has hand will be stretched out to receive [payment] from him when he says to him, “I cancel [the debt].”

Similarly, when [an accidental] killer has been exile to a city of refuge, and the citizens want to honor him, he must say to them: “I am a murderer.” If they say: “Even so, [we want to honor you], then he may accept [the honor] from them, because it says: “And this is the word of the murderer” (Deuteronomy 19:4). The Torah uses similar words when describing the accidental killer who must flee to the refuge city. Therefore the rabbis derive a similar halakhah. When arriving at the refuge city the accidental killer must let the people of the city know that he is not coming as a simple tourist or person wishing to take up residence. He must tell them that he is an accidental killer. However, if they still wish to honor him even though they know he is an accidental killer, he may accept the honor.

שנאמר וזה דבר השמטה – meaning to say that mere speech that he he emits from his lips that he cancels is enough, and the first word that he stated, “I cancel” is sufficient, and he does not need to say and repeat, as it states (Deuteronomy 15:2): “This shall be the nature [of the remission],” you have nothing other than the first word, and similarly (Deuteronomy 19:4): “Now this is the case [of the manslayer who may flee there and live].”

המחזיר חוב בשביעית (one who repays a debt cancelled by the Seventh Year) – the borrower/debtor says to the lender/creditor, “even so/nevertheless,” and returns to him his money, the Sages are pleased with him.

Introduction In the final mishnah of Sheviit we learn that although one is not obligated to pay back a debt that has been remitted by the seventh year, the sages praise a debtor who does so in any case. Our mishnah teaches two other instances in which a person is not obligated to do something but nevertheless should do so. This is an important category in all forms of law, be it Jewish law or other forms of law. The law tells a person bottom-line what she/he has to do it does not always tell a person what he should do. There is a realm, in my opinion, of morality that goes beyond the law. This is the subject of our mishnah.

לא יחזיר לבניו – he is not obligated to return [the debt] to his children (i.e., of the convert), if the convert died.

One who repays his debts after the seventh year, the sages are pleased with him. As I noted in yesterday’s mishnah, it is praiseworthy to pay back a loan, even if it has been remitted by the seventh year. After all, the person really does owe the money. Perhaps we could say that he should take advantage of the sabbatical year remission only if he absolutely must do so.

ואם החזיר רוח חכמים ננוחה הימנו – and exactly to his children that were converted with him, because an idolater inherits his father from the Torah, as it is written (Deuteronomy 2:5): “I have given the hill country of Seir as a possession to Esau,” and if he doesn’t return [the loan] to his (i.e., the convert’s) children, one can suspect lest they will return to their original nature when they say,” if we were idolaters, we would inherit their fathers, and it would be necessary to return [the debt] to them, but if their parents were not were lacking holiness (i.e., the children were conceived while they were heathens) but at their births, they were in holiness (i.e., the children were born when they became Israelites), they didn’t inherit their fathers from the Torah, for their inheritance would not ever be appropriate for them , one cannot suspect this less they return to their original nature, and one who ever restores it (i.e., the inheritance) to them, the Sages are not pleased with him.

One who borrows from a convert whose sons had converted with him, the debt need not be repaid to his sons, but if he returns it the sages are pleased with him. Conversion is considered to be a process similar to birth a person is in a sense “born-again” when they convert. Therefore, they lose any legal ties to their parents or children and according to Torah law, children who convert do not inherit from their parents. Therefore, if someone owes a convert money and the convert dies, technically he need not repay the convert’s children who were born before he converted (if they were born after he converted then they are legally considered his children). However, the rabbis praise a person who does repay this loan, because, after all, he does in reality owe the money, and we all know that in reality, these are his children.

כל המטלטלין נקנין במשיכה – and whenever he did not take possession by drawing or seizing an object each one of them can retract, and even though he (i.e., the potential purchaser) gave the money, the monies do not purchase until he draws/seizes the object that is acquired, but nevertheless, a person who fulfills his word and doesn’t retract, and even if he did not take possession by drawing or seizing an object, the Sages are pleased with him, for it is taught in a Baraitha (Talmud Bava Metzia 49a on Leviticus 19:36): “You shall have [an honest balance, honest weights,] an honest ephah, and an honest hin,” that your “no”/negative response will be in righteousness and your “yes”/positive response will be in righteousness.

All movable property can be acquired [only] by the act of drawing, but whoever fulfills his word, the sages are well pleased with him. When a person acquires movable property, that is to say, things such as animals and objects, he must actually take them into his possession in order to acquire them. Money does not itself effect acquisition. Therefore, if Reuven buys, for instance, a table from Shimon and gives Shimon the money, the table is not his until he actually takes possession of it. Should Shimon find a better price for the table, he could sell it to someone else and just return the money to Reuven. Similarly, Reuven could ask for his money back if he finds a better table or a better price. However, the sages praise a person who keeps his word and does not renege on a deal, even when he is allowed to do so. Congratulations! We have finished Sheviit! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. As I wrote this commentary to Sheviit, Israel was beginning to observe a sabbatical year. I am not adding plants to my garden and when I go to the store I check the labels on the produce I buy to make sure that I am not buying “sabbatical year produce.” While I know that most of the readers of this commentary yare living outside of Israel, everyone should know that many of the laws in this tractate are still influential and practiced in the land. Observing the shemittah in Israel and still maintaining a modern economy, all the while protecting the needs of farmers has been a great challenge to rabbis, and continues to be a major issue to this day. The tractate is also interesting because it is the most environmental tractate in the Mishnah. The Torah’s laws teach us that human beings do not ultimately possess the land they are merely sojourners on it, for the land actually belongs to God. It is clear, at least to me, that the greatest challenge that our generation and probably all future generations face, is the massive environmental damage humans have done and continue to do to our planet. We risk making the world simply an uninhabitable place to live. Sheviit teaches us that the land needs to rest, it needs to recover from all that we ask of it. While we may not be able to fulfill all of these laws the way that they were originally formulated, the message is one that resonates with greater alarm every day. I just hope that we listen in time to make a difference. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Terumot.