Comentario sobre Eduyot 6:2
הֵעִיד רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְרַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא בֶּן אֱלִינָתָן אִישׁ כְּפַר הַבַּבְלִי, עַל אֵבֶר מִן הַמֵּת שֶׁהוּא טָמֵא, שֶׁרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, לֹא אָמְרוּ אֶלָּא עַל אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, וַהֲלֹא קַל וָחֹמֶר. וּמַה מִן הַחַי שֶׁהוּא טָהוֹר, אֵבֶר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ טָמֵא, הַמֵּת שֶׁהוּא טָמֵא, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיִּהְיֶה אֵבֶר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ טָמֵא. אָמַר לָהֶם, לֹא אָמְרוּ אֶלָּא עַל אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי. דָּבָר אַחֵר, מְרֻבָּה טֻמְאַת הַחַיִּים מִטֻּמְאַת הַמֵּתִים, שֶׁהַחַי עוֹשֶׂה מִשְׁכָּב וּמוֹשָׁב מִתַּחְתָּיו, לְטַמֵּא אָדָם וּלְטַמֵּא בְגָדִים, וְעַל גַּבָּיו מַדָּף לְטַמֵּא אֳכָלִים וּמַשְׁקִין, מַה שֶּׁאֵין הַמֵּת מְטַמֵּא:
R. Yehoshua y R. Nechunia b. Elinathan de Kfar Habavli testificó acerca de una parte [menos del tamaño de una aceituna], que se había separado de un cadáver, que es tamei. [(Todos están de acuerdo en que el tamaño de una aceituna de un cadáver es tamei como el cuerpo mismo. Discuten solo sobre una pequeña parte, menos que el tamaño de una aceituna)]. Para R. Eliezer dice: Ellos (los sabios) dijeron [que las partes del cuerpo no tienen un tamaño (mínimo) (para tumah) solo aproximadamente una parte de un animal vivo, [pero una parte de un animal muerto requiere un tamaño (mínimo) para tumah]. Le dijeron: ¿No es derivable por kal vachomer (a fortiori) [que una parte de un animal muerto (incluso menos de un tamaño de aceituna) es tamei, a saber] Si es de un animal vivo, que es tahor (limpio), una parte (incluso menos que un tamaño de aceituna) que se separa de ella es tamei—un animal muerto, que es tamei, ¿no sigue (a fortiori) que una parte que se separa de él es tamei? Él les dijo: Hablaban solo de una parte de un animal vivo. Y, además, [en refutación del kal vachomer], ¡la tuma de los vivos es más grande que la de los muertos! Para los vivos [es decir, un zav, cuando está vivo], se vuelve impuro a través de mishkav y moshav (impureza del sillón y del asiento) [todas las vasijas] debajo de él, [incluso cien de ellas] para hacer impuro a un hombre y hacer prendas sucias, [a saber. (Levítico 15: 5): "Y un hombre que toca lo que él (un zav) se acuesta lavará su ropa".] Y rinde lo que está encima de él "madaf" [Todos los vasos sobre el zav, aunque sean cien, uno encima del otro, adquieren impureza madaf; eso es tumah "ligero", que no deja impuros a los hombres y vasos, como lo hacen mishkav y moshav que están debajo de él, sino (solo) comida y bebida. ("madaf" como en Levítico 26:36: "el sonido de una hoja [nidaf] impulsada")—es decir, tumah "ligero". O, como en "su nodo abiertof (se extiende)," el "olor" del tumah del zav se extiende hasta dejar impuros todos los recipientes por encima de él, a pesar de que no los tocó]—- que no se ve afectado por un cadáver. [Para los vasos debajo de un cuerpo muerto, solo el primero, el segundo y el tercero adquieren impurezas, por maga (contacto). La vasija que toca el cadáver se vuelve como el cadáver mismo, convirtiendo la vasija que la toca en "av" (un "padre" de impureza). Y la tercera que toca se convierte en un rishon ("primero"), después del cual las vasijas no son a su vez, tamei, los vasos adquieren tumah solo del av de tumah. Del mismo modo, de los vasos sobre el cadáver, solo el primero, el segundo y el tercero son tamei, a modo de maga, (contacto), y no a través de mishkav y moshav.]
Bartenura on Mishnah Eduyot
English Explanation of Mishnah Eduyot
whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: they declared [this] only of a limb from a living [man].
They said to him: is not there an inference from the minor to the major (kal: If in the case of a living man [who is himself pure] a limb severed from him is impure, how much more in the case of a corpse [which is itself impure] should a limb severed from it be impure!
He said to them: they have [nevertheless] declared it only of a limb from a living man.
Another answer: The impurity of living men is greater than the impurity of corpses, because a living man causes that on which he lies and sits to become capable of making impure a man and clothing, and [he causes also] what is over him to transfer impurity to foods and liquids- which is defilement that a corpse does not cause.
This mishnah contains Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia ben Elinathan’s testimony regarding the impurity of a limb separated from a corpse.
The dispute in our mishnah concerns whether or not a limb separated from corpse transmits tent impurity (anything which is under the same roof with it becomes impure). Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia state that it is impure. Rabbi Eliezer states that it is pure, and that the only type of “separated limb” which is impure is one that has been separated from a living body.
Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunya respond with a classic type of Talmudic argumentation, called a “kal vehomer”. Generally a corpse is considered the greatest source of impurity, whereas a living body is often not a source of impurity at all. [It is not in and of itself impure; it only becomes impure if it contracts it somehow.] If a limb separated from a living body is impure, even though the living body itself is pure, all the more so a limb separated from a corpse is impure, since the corpse itself is impure.
Rabbi Eliezer’s response is very typical of Rabbi Eliezer. He states that although Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunya’s reasoning may be good reasoning, the tradition that he received from his teachers was only that a limb separated from a living body was impure. Even though there may be logic in extending this principle to include limbs from corpses, Rabbi Eliezer does not believe that it is the sage’s responsibility to add on to received traditions. Rabbi Eliezer is known as an arch-traditionalist; in another place he claims never to have stated anything that he did not hear from his teachers. Here we see classic example of Rabbi Eliezer sticking to his received tradition, in the face of a good argument to extend that tradition.
The final section of the mishnah contains a logical refutation of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunya’s kal vehomer argument. In order to refute a kal vehomer argument one must point out that one side is not always more stringent than the other side. In other words, if the kal vehomer was based on a stable, predictable relationship between two things, the refutation points out that this relationship is not so predictable. In this case Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunya had pointed out that a corpse is more impure than a living body, and therefore if something that comes from a living body is impure, all the more so the same thing that comes from a corpse will be impure. The refutation points out that with regards to some laws, the living body is a greater source of impurity than the corpse. A zav (a person with an unusual genital discharge) causes anything on which he sits or lies to become impure and able to transmit impurity to people or clothing. He also causes anything above him to become impure and able to transmit impurity to food and liquids. The corpse does not have such a strong ability to impart impurity. Since in some ways the living body can have a stronger impurity than the corpse, one cannot make the kal vehomer argument that Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunya tried to make.