Talmud for Gittin 4:1

הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְהִגִּיעַ בַּשָּׁלִיחַ, אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁלַח אַחֲרָיו שָׁלִיחַ וְאָמַר לוֹ, גֵּט שֶׁנָּתַתִּי לְךָ בָּטֵל הוּא, הֲרֵי זֶה בָטֵל. קָדַם אֵצֶל אִשְׁתּוֹ אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁלַח אֶצְלָהּ שָׁלִיחַ וְאָמַר לָהּ, גֵּט שֶׁשָּׁלַחְתִּי לִיךְ בָּטֵל הוּא, הֲרֵי זֶה בָטֵל. אִם מִשֶּׁהִגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ, שׁוּב אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבַטְּלוֹ:

If one sent a get to his wife, and he came upon the messenger, or if he sent a messenger after him and said to him: "The get that I gave you is void," it is void. [("if he came upon the messenger":) without having pursued him to overtake him, but the messenger stopping on the way and the husband chancing upon him and voiding the get. Even so, it is void, and we do not say that he was simply taunting him and that if he really had wanted to void it, he would have pursued him.] If he reached his wife first or sent a messenger to her, telling her: "The get that I sent you is void," it is void. Once the get has reached her hand (however) he can no longer void it. [We are hereby apprised that even though we see him bent upon voiding it, we do not say that this is clear indication of its having been voided. And in an instance in which a man gives his wife a get (to take effect) at a certain time or with (the fulfillment of) a certain condition — if he says to her: "This is your get from now, (to take effect) at that time," or "if that condition is fulfilled," once the get reaches her hand, he can no longer void it, and she is divorced at that time or with the fulfillment of that condition. And if he did not say to her: "from now," then even after the get reached her hand, he can void it.]

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot

Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? As Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, nobody may revoke his agency by words. Explain it that he said, go and fix it to the North and [the agent] went and fixed it to the South⁴¹The disagreement between R. Simeon ben Laqish and R. Joḥanan, whether a verbal authorization may be revoked by simple pronouncement, not necessarily in the presence of the agent, is in Giṭṭin 4:1–2, fol. 45c, and Babli Qiddušin 59a. The Babli explains the problem away; its opinion is that R. Simeon ben Laqish disallows verbal revocation only in matters of marriage and divorce which never can be executed by words alone. The Yerushalmi disagrees and holds that R. Simeon ben Laqish always requires an action (in the case of authorization to proceed with a divorce, a court action) to terminate duly established agency. In our case here, he permits a shortcut for termination only if the agent deviates from his instructions. On the other hand, the Yerushalmi notes that in case of an action of divorce, agency can be terminated only in the presence of the agent or by written document delivered to the other party even for R. Joḥanan since any other course of action would have unforseeable consequences..

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Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin

HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent,” etc. ²¹⁹Since the argument is repeated for Mishnah 9, it is clear that the Halakhah refers both to Mishnah 8 and Mishnah 9. The statement of R. Joḥanan is in Giṭṭin 4:1, see Notes 2–3 there for explanation. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates agency by a declaration? He explains it by the stringency of the rules of adultery and incest. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun understood this from the latter part: “Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself.” Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates agency by a declaration? He explains it by the stringency of the rules of adultery and incest.

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