Commentary for Gittin 9:14

המגרש...רבי אליעזר מתיר – The reason of Rabbi Eliezer, as is written (concerning the laws of the Kohanim) (Leviticus 21:7): “nor shall they marry one divorced from her husband. [For they are holy to their God].” Even if they were not divorced from other than their husband, since he said to her: You are divorced from me, but you are not permitted to all [other] men, is for she is forbidden to the priesthood. So we see that it is a Jewish bill of divorce, and here she is permitted to any men except from this, she is permitted to others.

Introduction This mishnah deals with a man who tried to divorce his wife but at the same time restrict her from subsequently marrying a certain man. Generally speaking divorce frees a woman to marry almost anyone who she wishes to marry (except priests and anyone related to her previous husband). The background to this case is probably that the husband is divorcing his wife because he suspects that she has committed adultery with a certain man. By divorcing her, he does not want to allow her to go marry the very man whom he suspects.

וחכמים אוסרים – since they say that the prohibition of the priesthood is different. For the Biblical verse has increased for them (i.e., the priesthood) additional commandments, and even though that the Jewish bill of divorce would make her ineligible to the priesthood, it would not be a Jewish bill of divorce that would permit her to others. And the Halakah is according to the Sages. But the Rabbis did not forbid other than when he said: “You are permitted to all other men other than so-and-so.” The Rabbis admit that it is a Jewish bill of divorce in that it permitted her to all men through the delivery of the Jewish bill of divorce, but that he made a condition with her that she would not marry that particular individual, for it would be like other kinds of conditions in general. But the Rabbis forbade the one who divorces to say: “Behold, this is your Jewish bill of divorce on the condition that you should marry so-and-so,” so that they would not say that they give their wives to one another as gifts. And every condition that a person makes with regard to a Jewish bill of divorce prior to the writing of the Jewish bill of divorce, even though the condition is not written within it, the Jewish bill of divorce is invalid, but after it was given to her in her hand, he can make whatever condition he wishes to make.

If a man divorces his wife and said to her, “You are free to marry any man but so-and-so”, Rabbi Eliezer permits her [to marry on the strength of this get], but the rabbis forbid her. Rabbi Eliezer allows the woman to remarry on the strength of this get. She can marry anyone save the person whom her husband stated she was not allowed to marry. The remainder of the sages declared this get to be invalid. In the Talmud, there is recorded a story of four sages who gathered together to refute Rabbi Eliezer after his death. Indeed the opposition to this opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is among the most vehement in the Talmud. Evidently, the rabbis believed that for divorce to work it must totally sever the legal relationship between the man and woman. Any retention of his control over her undermines the entire validity of divorce.

What should he do? He should take it back from her and give it to her again saying, “You are free to marry any man.” If he wrote [the restriction] in the get, even though he went back and erased it, it is invalid. In this section we learn how the husband can fix the situation so that his wife is legally divorced. If he has not written the words “but so-and-so” in the get, he need merely take the get back from her and restate the divorce formula correctly. However, if he has written the invalidating words in the get, the document itself is irreparably invalid.

אלמנה לכהן גדול – since the betrothal takes legal effect when violating negative commandments, for in those [mentioned in the Mishnah] do not take legal effect due because of the prohibition of marital state within it; It is to be forgotten if he left it in the Jewish bill of divorce.

Introduction This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. Again, while divorcing his wife, the husband attempts to restrict her from subsequently marrying a certain man. Yesterday we learned that the sages consider such a get to be invalid. Today, the mishnah discusses what would happen if the man to whom the husband tried to restrict his wife was in any case prohibited to her.

[If he said,] “You are permitted to any man but my father, your father, my brother, your brother, a slave, a Gentile, or anyone to whom she is incapable of being betrothed,” the get is valid. In this section the husband tells his wife that she may not subsequently marry someone whom she couldn’t subsequently marry in any case. All of the men in this list cannot possibly contract marriage with her. In other words his restrictions on the divorce were in essence meaningless, because she couldn’t marry any of them in any case. Hence, the get is valid.

[If he said,] “You are permitted to anyone but (supposing she was a a high priest, or, (supposing she was a divorcee or a an ordinary priest, or, (supposing she was a mamzeret or a a regular Israelite, or (supposing she was an a mamzer or a natin, or anyone who is capable of betrothing her even in transgression, the get is invalid. In this section, the husband restricts his wife from marrying someone who would be prohibited to her, but to whom she could possibly be betrothed. The marriages listed in this section are possible even though they carry with them a transgression. For instance, his wife was a mamzeret and he says “You are permitted to any but to so-and-so the Israelite”. In such cases, the get is invalid because his restriction was not meaningless. We should note that the list in this section is a stock list, since not all of these categories are relevant in this situation. The woman whom he is divorcing will in any case be prohibited to a priest, as are all divorcees. However, this is a stock list and hence it appears in all places as an entirety.

גופו של גט – the essence of the writing of the Jewish bill of divorce, such they should write in it.

The body of the get is: “Behold you are permitted to any man.” Rabbi Judah says: [he must add] “And this shall be to you from me a writ of divorce and a letter of release and a bill of dismissal, with which you may go and marry any man that you wish.”
The body of a writ of emancipation is: “Behold you are a free woman”, “Behold you belong to yourself.”
This mishnah provides the wording for the standard parts of divorce documents and documents which free slaves.
The mishnah is straightforward and doesn’t require any explanation. One thing to note is that Rabbi Judah’s addition to the get is in Aramaic. Documents in this period were in Aramaic (or Greek), the lingua franca(s) of Palestine during the mishnaic and talmudic periods. Rabbi Judah may have insisted that the get be in Aramaic so that everyone would understand it.

ודין די יהוי ליכי מינאי – it is necessary to prove in its interior that via this “book,” he divorces her, for it he not written this in it, people would come to say that through mere speech he divorced her and the document is mere proof. And the Halakha is according to Rabbi Yehuda.

כתב בכתב ידו ואין עליו עדים – For Rabbi Meir who said that the witnesses who affix their signatures [to the Jewish bill of divorce] make the divorce final, one’s signature is considered like one-hundred witnesses. But for Rabbi Eliezer who says that the witnesses who deliver [the Jewish bill of divorce] make the divorce final, since it is his handwriting, and the Biblical text reads (Deuteronomy 24:1): “and he writes [her a bill of divorcement, hands it [to her]…,” and even though the witnesses who deliver the [Jewish bill of divorce] are not valid from the Torah and the Sages invalidated it lest they come to make it fit through the writing of the scribe.

There are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit:
If the husband wrote it with his own hand but there are no witnesses on it.
If there are witnesses on it but no date.
If it has a date but only one witness. These are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit. Rabbi Elazar says even though there are no witnesses on it, as long as he gave it to her in the presence of witnesses it is valid, [and on the strength of it] she may collect her ketubah [even] from mortgaged property, since the witnesses only sign on the get because of tikkun olam.
This mishnah teaches that there are three gittin which are invalid, but nevertheless if a woman were to remarry on the strength of one of them, a child from the subsequent marriage is not a mamzer, as he would be were the get to be completely invalid. In other words, “lechatchilah” ab initio the woman should not remarry based on one of these gittin. However, “bediavad” ex post facto if she has married using one of these gittin, her subsequent marriage is not considered adulterous. Another way of putting this is that the get is kosher “deoraitta” according to Torah law, but the rabbis declared it invalid “derabanan” from rabbinic authority.
Get #1: If the husband wrote the get in his own hand, it will be easy to verify that he wrote the get through comparison of his handwriting. Therefore, the get is valid, at least bediavad/deoraita. However, witnesses are always preferable and considered to be more conclusive. Therefore, the rabbis said that the get was invalid and that “lechatchilah” a woman should not remarry using it.
Get #2: The rabbis declared that a get without a date is invalid. We learned above in mishnah 2:2, that without a date we fear that the woman may improperly collect her ketubah from mortgaged property. However, the get is not completely invalid and if she uses it to remarry, her subsequent child is not a mamzer.
Get #3: In this case, there is only one witness, and not the two that are normally required. Again, the get is invalid, at least derabbanan, but nevertheless if she does use it to remarry the subsequently born child is not a mamzer.
Rabbi Elazar goes even further than does the previous opinion and claims that even if there are no witnesses on the get, the get is completely valid and may even be used to collect the ketubah from the husband’s mortgaged property. Certainly she can remarry, according to Rabbi Elazar, on the strength of this get. Rabbi Elazar holds that the witnesses who are essential in the divorce process are not those who sign on the get, but rather those who witness the husband transfer the get to the wife. The only reason that witnesses sign on the get is for “tikkun olam” the improvement of the world. It will be easier for the woman to certify the validity of her get using the signatures on the get, and hence they sign for her benefit. If she decides to remarry without such benefit, it is her right. That witnesses sign because of tikkun olam was also learned above in mishnah 4:3.

ואין בו זמן – for the date is an ordinance of the Rabbis, whether because of the usufruct or because lest he is partial over his sister’s daughter, as we said in the second chapter.

ואין בו אלא עד אחד – there is, according to the one who says that it refers to his handwriting, and the first part of our Mishnah comes to teach us that even if there is no witnesses [that has signed the Jewish bill of divorce], the child is valid. And here it comes to teach us that even when there is ab initio, one witness [whose signature is affixed], it is not valid. And according to the one who says that it refers to the handwriting of the scribe, even so, the offspring is valid, for the scribe is in place of the second witness.

תקון עולם – lest the witnesses to the delivery [of the Jewish bill of divorce] die and the husband comes and raises a complaint saying that I did not divorce her. And the Halakha is according to Rabbi Eliezer.

שני גיטין שוין – in their names

Introduction The first section of this mishnah is about two men with the same name who both send a get to their wives, who also share the the same name, and the one delivering the gittin mixes the two of them up. (You can imagine what kind of mail problems they must have had!) The final two sections are about five men who try to combine their gittin into one document, perhaps in an attempt to save the costs of the parchment and the scribe.

הרי השני בטל – for we don’t know whom he is

Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. Since we don’t know which get belongs to which woman, both gittin must be given to each woman. If one of the two mixed-up gittin is lost, then neither woman can be divorced because we don’t know if she is receiving the get from her husband. This requirement is related to the halakhah which we learned in chapter three that a get must be written specifically for the wife being divorced. Although both gittin are exactly the same, they both have to be given to the right woman.

כלל – one time for all of them, on such-and-such day of the week, so-and-so divorced this woman and that person divorced the other person.

If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. The mishnah teaches that multiple men can divorce their wives with the same document. In order for the get to be valid for all of the wives, they must write the names of the divorcing men and their wives before the formula. This way it is clear that the formula refers to all five husbands and that the witnesses are signing on all five gittin. In addition, the get must be given to each woman, since a woman is not divorced until she receives the get in her hand.

טופס לכל אחת – a particular time to each one, on such-and-such a day of the week, a certain man divorced a certain woman and completed [the writing of] the Jewish bill of divorcer. And on such -and-such a day of the week a certain man divorced a certain woman and completed the Jewish bill of divorce, and similarly for all of them. And the witnesses [sign] below at the bottom.

If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid. In this case, the scribe writes out what is essentially a separate get for each man, complete with a divorce formula for each one. Therefore, it may look as if the witnesses who signed on the bottom of the get are only attesting to the last get. This is “the one with which the signatures are read.” Hence, only this get is valid.

כשני דפין שכתבן – on two pages this one on the side of the other, and two Hebrews inscribing their signatures under the first Jewish bill of divorce to under the second [Jewish bill of divorce]. The name of the first witness is under the first [Jewish bill of divorce] and the name of his father is under the second {Jewish bill of divorce], and similarly, the seonc witness underneath him. And afterwards, they went back and had two Israelites who live in the land of Greece, who signed in Greek writing , and the manner of Greek writing is that it goes from left to rightg, so that we would find the name of the witness under the second [Jewish bill of divorce] and the name of his father under the first [Jewish bill of divorce].

Introduction This mishnah discusses the validity of two gittin written side by side on one sheet of paper, with one set of witnesses testifying (or appearing to testify) to the validity of both of them.

If two gittin are written [on the same sheet] side by side and the signatures of two witnesses in Hebrew [stretch] from under one to under the other and then signatures of two witnesses in Greek [stretch] from under one get to under the other, the one with which the two first signatures are read is valid. The question in this mishnah is, are the witnesses testifying to the validity of both or only of the gittin, or perhaps can we not consider them as testifying to either. Hebrew is written from right to left. Hence, if the first two witnesses signed in Hebrew, their own names will be under the get on the right side, and their father’s names under the get on the left side, since people signed “so-and-so son of so-and-so.” Since the get on the right side has the witnesses actual name it is valid. However, we cannot be sure that the Greek witnesses are testifying to either get, since there is a break between their signatures and the get itself. Hence, only the get on the right side is valid. Had the Greek witnesses signed first, the left get would have been valid, since Greek is written from left to right.

את שהעדים הראשונים נקראים עמו כשר – if the Hebrews who affixed their signatures above, for it is the manner of Hebrew writing that it goes from the right to the left, and we find the name of the witness underneath the right-hand Jewish bill of divorce, and the name of his father underneath the left-hand Jewish bill of divorce, the right-hand [Jewish bill of divorce] is valid. But if the Greek signatures [are found] above, the left-hand [Jewish bill of divorce] is valid, for the names of the witnesses are under the left-hand [Jewish bill of divorce]. And the reason for this is that we suspect lest the latter witnesses swriched their writing to the order/manner of the first set of witnesses, for if the Hebrew [writers] were above , which they go from the right to the left and they affixed their signatures on the right-hand Jewish bill of divorce, when the two Greek [Jews] came to affix their signatures underneath theirs, they also went from the right to the left, like the order of Hebrew writing. And we found that all four of them affixed their signatures on the right-hand Jewish bill of divorce. And similarly, if the Greek [Jews] had affixed their signatures above , lest the Hebrew writers who came after them switched the order of their Hebrew writing, and went from the left to the right, so that it was found that all four of them affixed their signatures on the left-side [Jewish bill of divorce].

If there is one signature in Hebrew and one in Greek and then another signature in Hebrew and a signature in Greek [stretching] from under one [get] to under the other, both are invalid. In this case, the signatures alternate between Hebrew and Greek. This is problematic, because the Hebrew signatures can only work for the get on the right side and the Greek signatures can only work for the get on the left side. If the first signature is in Hebrew, it counts for the right get. The next signature in Greek counts for the left get. The third signature, which is in Hebrew, is for the right get but it cannot be counted together with the first signature because the second signature interferes. Similarly, the fourth signature, which is in Greek, cannot count with the second signature, for the third interferes. Hence, neither the left nor right get is valid.

ה"ג עד אחד עברי ועד אחד יוני, ועד אחד עברי ועד אחד יוני באים מתחת זה לתחת זה שניהם פסולין – And the reason is that we suspect lest the Hebrew [writing] witness affixed his signature on the first right-hand side Jewish bill of divorce, according to the manner of Hebrew writing, and the Greek [Jewish] second witness affixed his signature on the second left-hand side Jewish bill of divorce, according to the manner of Greek writing which begins from the left, but the third Hebrew witness, switched the Hebrew writing and also began from the left like the Greek [Jew] before him, and it was found that he too had his signature affixed on the left-side Jewish bill of divorce; but the final Greek [Jewish] witness had his signature affixed in his [normal] manner, from the left to the right, and he too had his signature affixed on the left-side Jewish bill of divorce; hence it was found that three witnesses had their signatures affixed on the left-side Jewish bill of divorce, with only one [witness] with his signature affixed on the right-side [Jewish bill of divorce]. Or the opposite, where the second Greek witness, reversed his writing to the order of Hebrew writing and began from the right to the left like the first Hebrew witness who affixed his signature, and the third Hebrew witness affixed his signature as per his manner from the right-side, and we found that three of them had affixed their signatures on the first right-side Jewish bill of divorce, but the final Greek [Jewish] witness alone affixed his signature as per his manner on the left-hand side Jewish bill of divorce. And because we do not know upon which of them three of them affixed their signatures and which of them only one of them affixed his signature, both [Jewish bills of divorce] are invalid.

בדף השני – which near on the width of the scroll

Introduction This mishnah discusses scenarios where due to the way in which the writing of the get is found on the paper, it is somewhat doubtful whether the witnesses are testifying to the get.

מן הצד – on the margin on the right side of the Jewish bill of divorce or on he left-hand margin.

If he left over some of the get [from the first sheet] and he wrote the rest of the get on the next column and the witnesses [sign] below, [the get is] valid. A scribe folds a piece of parchment in half and begins to write the get on the right hand column. He doesn’t have room to complete the get, so he continues on the top of the left hand column. If the witnesses signed below the left hand column, the get is valid. We can assume that they were testifying also to what is written in the right column.

או מאחוריו בגט פשוט – that its witnesses are inside it

If the witnesses have signed at the top of the sheet or at the side or on the back of a simple get, it is invalid. A simple get is one that is not folded. It is simply written and usually signed below. Signing on the back of such a get is not valid. Signing on top or on the side is never valid because the signatures are not read with the text. It could be that the signatures were originally on something else on that piece of paper, and then the person cut it off, thereby creating a forgery. The signatures must always be directly below the text of the get.

הקיף – attached this one next to that one

If he connected the top of one get to the top of another and the witnesses’ signatures are between the two, both of them are invalid. In the following three sections, two gittin were written on one page, in one column, each containing a separate divorce formula. If the two tops meet in the middle and the signatures are in the middle as well, then neither get is valid because the signatures do not read with either get. In other words, the signatures are above each get and hence they are both invalid.

שניהם פסולים – for it is not called “affixing one’s signature” neither with this one or with that one.

If the end of one is connected to the end of the other and the witnesses’ signatures are between, the one with which the witnesses’ signatures reads is valid. Here the scribe placed the gittin with the two bottoms connected to each other and the witnesses signed in between. The get which is read in the same direction as the witnesses is valid and the other is not.

את שהעדים נקרין בסופו – he made a mistake while affixing his signature towards the end, but if the feet of the signature are not facing towards the head, it is valid.

If the top of one is connected to the bottom of the other and the witnesses’ signatures are in the middle, the one with which the witnesses’ signatures reads is valid. Here he simply wrote two gittin in a row and the witnesses signed in the middle. The top one has signatures which read with it, and therefore is valid. The bottom one has signatures above it and hence is invalid.

כתב סופר ועד – the scribe affixed his signature as a witness , for they had two witnesses, and our Mishnah comes to teach us that we don’t suspect lest the husband did not command the scribe to affix his signature but said to two [individuals]: “say to the scribe and he will write,” and to so-and-so and another person [will be] witnesses and they will affix their signatures to it, and these witnesses were suspect and put to the shame by the scribe who would say: “I am not valid in his (i.e., the husband’s) eyes and I will affix my signature to it without the permission of the husband.” To that we do not suspect.

Introduction The first section of the mishnah discusses gittin written in languages different from the language in which the witnesses signed. The second section deals with how witnesses sign a get. The third section deals with the way in which the husband and wife’s names may be written. The fourth and final section deals with husbands whom the court forces to divorce their wives. This last issue is obviously a crucial one, and I will discuss it at somewhat greater length below.

חניכתו – the accompanying name of the family

A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. In all of these cases we might have feared that since the person signed a language different from that in which the get was written, the signer did not actually understand the document. The mishnah nevertheless rules that these gittin are valid, relying on people’s good faith not to sign documents unless they know what is written in them. This section also teaches that the scribe himself may sign the get. His role as scribe and his role as witness are independent, and therefore he can act as both.

מעושה – with force

[If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. Normally, people would sign, “So-and-so, son of so-and-so, witness.” The mishnah teaches that while this is the normal custom, it is not necessary for the signature to be effective. A signature can be valid without one’s personal name, or without one’s family name or without the word “witness.” I should note that printed editions contain the line “And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do” at this point, and not as it appears in manuscripts, as part of the next section. According to this, the scrupulous in Jerusalem did not write the word “witness.” The manuscript version is clearly correct, as the line makes little sense here.

בישראל כשר – if they forced him in court, such as all of those where they force him to divorce, or that she was forbidden to him, and if they forced him inappropriately, it is invalid, and disqualifies to marry into the priesthood because of the slight resemblance to a Jewish bill of divorce

If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. Usually the scribe would write the husband and wife’s personal names. However, if he wrote their family names, which were not surnames as we now use but rather some sort of personal nicknames, the get is valid. Indeed, since these names are sometimes more precise, the practice of writing nicknames was common among the “scrupulous people of Jerusalem.”

ובנכרי – according to law, it is invalid and disqualifies from marrying into the priesthood; and in appropriate, even it does not have the slightest resemblance to a Jewish bill of divorce (by which the woman concerned might be precluded from marrying a Kohen); and whomever is liable to give a Jewish bill of divorce according to the law, and there is no power in the Jewish judges to force him, but when the gentile authorities bind him over and say: do as the Israelites tell you, and he gives the Jewish bill of divorce according to the judges of Israel.

A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is. Perhaps the most controversial issue in Jewish law today is the problem of the “agunah”, a woman who cannot obtain a divorce. Often (although not always) this is the result of the husband’s refusal to divorce his wife. The mishnah states quite clearly that if an Israelite court forces him to divorce his wife and he divorces her under duress, the divorce is nevertheless valid. Only if the coercion is done by a Gentile court, not acting according to Jewish law, is the get invalid. Even if Gentiles beat the recalcitrant husband, telling him to do what the Israelite court has told him to do (divorce his wife) the get is valid so long as the Gentiles are enforcing Jewish law. Gentile coercion invalidates the get only if it comes without the request of an Israelite court. After reading this mishnah, one might wonder why, if the Mishnah states that husbands may be compelled to divorce their wives, do women today find it often difficult to get a court to actually do so. I cannot answer this question fully in this forum but we should make three notes. First of all, it is not clear that this mishnah would apply in all cases. The question still needs to be asked; upon what grounds a court might force a husband to divorce his wife. The most important issue of all: what if the wife merely no longer wants to remain married to her husband, without any formal, specific grounds? Secondly, from the 12th century and onwards, rabbis became increasingly hesitant about compelling men to divorce. Hence, our modern problem is not so new. Thirdly, it seems to me that the modern problem is not one of halakhah, but rather of rabbis being overly hesitant in using halakhic authority. It is more of a sociological issue than a halakhic one. Rabbis could solve the problem, and many have made various suggestions of how to do so. They are often unwilling to solve the problem for sociological reasons. However, the subject is too important and complex to be dealt with fully here.

יצא שמה בעיר מקודשת – a free woman where a voice went forth about her: “so-and-so became betrothed today to a certain man, and not only an indistinct rumor (see Gittin 89a) but such as where candles were kindled and beds were made, and people would come and go and say,”so-and-so became betrothed today.”

Introduction This mishnah discusses a case where a rumor went around that a certain woman was either betrothed, and hence forbidden to marry anyone else, or divorced and permitted to remarry. Without full testimony regarding either status, her status would seem to be uncertain. Nevertheless, the mishnah generally relies on the rumors. We should remember that in mishnaic times they didn’t have the systems of verification and documentation that are available today and hence people would inevitably have to at least occasionally rely on rumors.

מגורשת -הרי זו מגורשת – It is referring to the first part of the Mishnah – where this woman upon whom a voice went out that she is betrothed and we are concerned for him and prohibit her to marry anyone other than to that man. And if he returned and a voice went out about her that she is divorced, for that same individual with whom a voice went out that she had become betrothed , she is divorced and permitted to all, for the voice that we were suspect of at first, his receipt is with him.

If a report goes out in the town: “[A certain woman is] betrothed,” she is regarded as betrothed; [If a report goes out in the town: “A certain woman is] divorced,” she is regarded as divorced. The mishnah regards either rumor as being true. The Talmud explains that a rumor alone would not be enough to create a legal assumption that a woman is married. Rather, physical signs of a marriage must have been observed. For instance, women seemed to be celebrating with her, saying “she’s married.” With regard to the rumor of divorce, the Talmud explains that this clause refers to the woman who was regarded as married based on a rumor. Since the assumption of her being married was not based on evidence but on a rumor, a rumor of divorce is sufficient to allow her to remarry. In contrast, a woman who was known to be married cannot be assumed to be divorced based on a rumor. Rather, she must bring evidence, either witnesses who saw her divorced or the document itself.

ובלבד שלא יהא שם כמתלא – as long as there is not with the voice of [her] betrothal or the voice of [her] divorce providing no reasonable explanation to show how the report may have arisen by mistake.

[This is only the case] provided the report has no qualification. What is meant by a qualification? [If the report is,] “So-and-so divorced his wife with a stipulation” [or], “He threw her the betrothal money, but it is uncertain whether it landed nearer to her or nearer to him” this is a qualification. If there is a “qualification” to the report, then it is not regarded as true. The “qualification” is something that would cause us to disbelieve the rumor. For instance, her husband attempted to divorce her, but the divorce came with a stipulation that was not fulfilled. Or he attempted to betroth her by throwing the betrothal money at her, but we’re not sure if it landed closer to her (in which case she is married) or closer to him (in which case she is not). In both of these cases, since there was a qualification to the rumor, the rumor is not accepted.

אפילו הקדיחה תבשילו – she burned it by fire or by salt. For the School of Hillel explains ערות דבר/something obnoxious about her (Deuteronomy 24:1) as either obnoxious or something, that is to say, like the rest of offensive [matters] which are not unchastity.

Introduction The final mishnah of the tractate is perhaps the most important and basic mishnah in the entire tractate. In it Bet Shammai, Bet Hillel and Rabbi Akiva dispute the grounds which justify divorce. Part of the basis for this dispute is exegetical how do we understand Deuteronomy 24:1, whose language is admittedly difficult and part of the debate is certainly based on ideology. We should remember that divorce was a hotly debated by Jews in the first century. Jesus and Paul were quite stringent in their opposition to divorce and the Dead Sea sect also probably prohibited divorce, or at least disallowed remarriage after divorce. The rabbis, with Bet Hillel and Rabbi Akiva at the fore, were more open to allowing people to divorce. This is not the proper forum for debating this issue but I will offer a couple of potential explanations for why rabbis were more open to divorce than were other sects of Jews. First of all, most rabbis took a much more positive attitude toward sexuality and procreation than did early Christians. Divorce allows a dysfunctional couple to fulfill their procreative and sexual desires elsewhere. Although divorce can be damaging and abused, it can also be beneficial, at least in rabbinic perspective. Secondly, the rabbis rarely used the Adam and Eve story as a source of halakhah. This story contains a strong monogamous ideal and was used by both Jesus and the Dead Sea sect as grounds for prohibiting divorce. Finally, divorce is clearly permitted by the Torah. Hence, rabbinic openness to divorce may be seen as at least partially stemming from a simple understanding that God allows divorce. However, this last reason is less convincing for whereas the Torah certainly allows divorce, it is unclear whether it is allowed in all occasions. The Torah leaves room for multiple interpretations as we shall see in our mishnah. While reading this mishnah and understanding this debate, I think we would do well to keep in mind that divorce can be a painful trauma. While the rabbis may advocate allowing divorce, they recognized well the human pain involved for both the man and the woman. Furthermore, we are dealing here with general principles. These principles and ideals would apply differently in individual people’s lives and marriages, each with their own nuances. By talking about the grounds for a husband to divorce his wife, we should not be callous to the real pain that real people feel in such situations.

רבי עקיבא אומר: אפילו מצא אחרת נאה ממנה – And he explains the verse in this way: if she will not find grace of beauty in his eyes, or if he found in her something unseemly, or a matter of something offensive. On each one of these three things, he can divorce her, and the Halakha is according to the School of Hillel

Bet Shammai says: a man should not divorce his wife unless he has found her guilty of some unseemly conduct, as it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Bet Hillel says [that he may divorce her] even if she has merely burnt his dish, since it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Rabbi Akiva says, [he may divorce her] even if he finds another woman more beautiful than she is, as it says, “it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes. The three positions in this mishnah are all based on differing interpretations of Deuteronomy 24:1 which states, “If a man takes a wife and possesses her, and she fails to please him because he finds something unseemly in her…” Bet Shammai interprets the verse to mean that he may only divorce her if he finds something “unseemly” in her. The word “unseemly” in Hebrew can also mean a forbidden sexual act. Therefore, Bet Shammai interprets the verse to mean that divorce is prohibited only if the husband suspects his wife of adultery. Bet Hillel focuses not on the word “unseemly” but on the word “thing.” The husband may divorce his wife if he finds any “thing” wrong with her, even something seemingly as trivial as burning his dish. Rabbi Akiva focuses upon the earlier part of the verse “she fails to please him” as separate grounds for divorce. Even if she has done nothing wrong, he may divorce her if he desires another woman more. We should note that Rabbi Akiva assumes that he won’t want to or be able to marry another woman while still married to his first wife. It could be that while polygamy was permitted, it wasn’t always so practical, for economic and social reasons. There are other versions which imply that Rabbi Akiva thinks that a husband may not stay married to one woman while he desires another. Rabbi Akiva’s ideal of marriage is one of love and such love cannot thrive when the husband desires another woman. Congratulations! We have finished Gittin. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. One of the most memorable parts of Gittin was the two middle chapters which discussed the concept of “tikkun olam” repairing the world. As we saw, “tikkun olam” means remedying economic, social and legal injustices in an attempt to make the world a more livable place. “Tikkun Olam” is always about going beyond the letter of the law. This is something we would do well to remember in general while learning rabbinic literature. Often what we are learning are the basic laws obligations and penalties. Clearly for the Jews and the rest of the world to have a just society, individuals must do more than just keep the law (although that would be a good start). They must look at each individual and individual situation and attempt to figure out what actions would aid in improving people’s lives and in avoiding conflict and pain, both now and in the future. Congratulations on making it through another tractate. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin the final tractate of Seder Nashim, tractate Kiddushin.