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המפקיד. ולא רצה לישבע – the oath of the bailees, for he was able to make himself exempt if he took an oath that he did was not negligent with it and did not make illegitimate use of it.

If a man left an animal or utensils in his fellow’s keeping and they were stolen or lost, and his fellow made restitution and did not want to take an oath – for they have taught: an unpaid guardian may take an oath and be exempt from liability – if the thief is found he must make twofold restitution, and if he slaughtered or sold the [sheep or ox] he must make four of fivefold restitution. To whom does he pay? He with whom the money was deposited.
If his fellow (the unpaid takes an oath and does not want to make restitution, if the thief is found he must make twofold restitution, and if he slaughtered or sold the [sheep or ox] he must make four of fivefold restitution. To whom does he pay? To the owner of the property deposited.
According to the Mishnah there are four different types of guardians or people who have responsibility to watch over other people’s objects. Each guardian has a different level of liability should the object be lost, damaged or die (if it was an animal). The Torah discusses guardians in Exodus 22:6-14.
1) The borrower. He is responsible to return the object at its original value to the owner no matter what happens to it. For instance should a person borrow a cow and the cow die even a natural death he would be obligated to give the owner the value of the live cow.
2) The renter. If the animal should be damaged or taken captive or die while he was renting it he may take an oath that he was not negligent with the animal and he is then exempt from paying back the value of the animal. If the animal should be stolen or lost he must repay the value of the animal.
3) The paid guardian, i.e. someone who is paid to watch the animal or object. His liability is the same as the renter’s.
4) The unpaid guardian. No matter what happens to the animal or object he may take an oath that he was not negligent in its care and then be exempt from paying.
As you will notice, the greater the benefit the greater the liability. A borrower, who uses the object and does not pay for the use only benefits. Therefore his liability is greatest. An unpaid guardian, who is not allowed to use the object, does not benefit at all. Therefore his liability is minimal. A renter gets to use the object but he pays for it. A paid guardian may not use the object but he gets paid for watching over it. Therefore renters and unpaid guardians have middle level liability.
These laws are a necessary background to many of the rules in our chapter and they will be dealt with at greater length in chapter eight.
Our mishnah deals with an object that is stolen or lost while under the watch of an unpaid guardian.
The scenario in the first half of the mishnah is as follows: a man leaves an animal or utensils with his friend who is an unpaid guardian. The animal or utensils are stolen by a thief. When the owner asks for them in return the unpaid guardian elects to repay the value instead of taking an oath. Assumedly he preferred to pay the value rather than take an oath lest the oath be a false oath. When the thief is found the thief must make twofold restitution if the animal was still alive and in his possession or fourfold or fivefold restitution if he had sold or slaughtered the animal (see chapter seven of Bava Kamma). The question our mishnah asks is who receives the payment. After all someone is going to benefit by receiving up to five times the value of the animal. In this scenario the guardian receives the money and the extra money as well. Since he already repaid the owner, it is as if he acquired the animal and all subsequent benefits that would come from the animal.
The difference in the second half of the mishnah is that the unpaid guardian took an oath and did not repay the owner. In such a case if the thief were to be found he would repay the value plus the penalty to the original owner.

למי שהפקדון שלו – for since he paid, he has acquired all of its indemnities. And even if he did not pay but rather since he said in the Jewish court that he would pay, he has acquired all of the indemnities. There is no difference made between double indemnity or four/five times the indemnity.

השוכר פרה מחבירו – and the renter/leasee stood and lent it (i.e., the cow) to another with the permission of the lender. But if the leaser had not given permission, we establish that a bailee who transferred [an object] to another bailee is liable.

If a man rented a cow from his fellow and lent it to another, and it died a natural death, the hirer must swear that it died a natural death and the borrower must repay [its value] to the renter.
Rabbi Yose said: “How can this one make business out of his friend’s cow? Rather [the value of the cow] returns to the owner.”
Mishnah two deals with the liability of a person who rents a cow and then subsequently loans the cow to someone else and the cow dies.
Mishnah three deals with a person who admits to having stolen or otherwise received money from one of two people but does not know from which one.
As we learned in the introduction to mishnah one, a renter is not liable to pay back the owner if the rented animal dies a natural death. In such a case he is allowed to take an oath and be exempt. The borrower, on the other hand, is liable to pay back the value of the borrowed animal even if it dies a natural death. In our mishnah a renter loaned the rented cow to a third party and then the cow died. The renter may take an oath that the cow died a natural death and he is exempt. The borrower, however, is liable to pay the value of the cow. Since he borrowed from the renter he must repay the renter.
Rabbi Yose claims that such a law allows the renter to make unfair profit from the cow that belongs to someone else. In his opinion the value of the cow should be paid from the borrower directly to the original owner. In other words, although the renter can exempt himself from paying by taking an oath, he does not thereby earn the rights to future benefits accrued from the animal.

ישבע השוכר – to the leaser

שמתה כדרכה – and is exempt [from payment], for the renter is exempt from unavoidable accidents.

והשואל – who is liable for unavoidable accidents , pays the renter, with an oath that he swears to the landlord.

אמר רבי יוסי: כיצד הלה עושה סחורה וכו' – And the Halakha is according to Rabbi Yosi.

אמר לשנים: גזלתי לאחד מכם – And they do not make a claim against him at all, but he wants to fulfill [his responsibility] according to heaven.

If a man said to two others, “I have robbed one of you 100 zuz and I do not know which of you it is”, or “The father of one of you left me 100 zuz and I do not know whose father it was”, he must give each of them 100 zuz, since he himself admitted liability. In this mishnah the person speaking knows that he owes one of two people 100 zuz (a coin), either because he robbed one of them or because one of their father’s deposited 100 zuz with him. According to the mishnah he must give each of them 100 zuz, since he admitted his liability. If he had not done so, he would not have been obligated to pay either of them until one could conclusively prove that he had stolen from him or that his father had deposited from him. However, if he wants to fulfill his full moral obligation he needs to pay them both 100 zuz.

נותן לזה מנה ולזה מנה – but two who make claim and he admits that the stole from one of them, every one takes an oath that he stole from him. The Sages imposed a fine upon him because he translated on לא תגזול/”you shall not commit robbery” (Leviticus 19:13); and similarly, two who make a claim against one, each one says: “My father deposited with you a Maneh.” And he states: “The father of one of you left with me a Maneh but I do not know which one [of you];” each one of them swore that his father left with him a Maneh, and he gives a Maneh to this one and a Maneh to that one. For he had committed an act of negligence against himself for he should have paid attention and to remember who left with him the Maneh.

שנים שהפקידו אצל אחד זה מנה וזה מאתים – such as the case where both of them deposited together one before the other.

Four
Two men deposited money with a third, the one 100 zuz and the other 200 zuz. [Afterward] one claimed that he deposited 200 and the other claimed that he deposited 200. He gives this one 100 zuz and this one 100 zuz and the rest remains until Elijah comes.
Rabbi Yose says: “If so, what does the deceiver lose? Rather the whole is left until Elijah comes.”
Mishnayoth four and five are very similar and we will therefore explain them together. They both deal with two people who deposited something with a third person and subsequently one of them makes a false claim as to what he deposited.
Mishnah six deals with a person whose friend deposited his produce with him and then his friend doesn’t return for an extended period.
In the scenarios in both of these mishnayoth two people deposit something with a third, one a larger deposit than the other. When they return to claim their deposit both claim to have deposited the larger amount of money (mishnah four or the more valuable vessel (mishnah five). Evidently the person who received the deposit does not remember who left which deposit. According to the first opinion each person should receive the value of the smaller deposit. If it was money than each person receives 100 zuz. If it was vessels one receives the less valuable vessel and the other vessel is sold and the value of the less valuable vessel is given to the other. The remainder of the money from the sale of the more expensive vessel stays with the third party until Elijah comes to clarify the matter.
Rabbi Yose points out that such a system does not punish a person for lying and claiming the larger deposit. Indeed, it may actually encourage him to do so. Therefore Rabbi Yose claims that all of the money should remain with the third party until Elijah comes. This way by lying the deceiver is penalized by not receiving even the smaller deposit. Hopefully, this will encourage him to tell the truth and thereby at least receive the smaller deposit. [This story reminds me of the famous story of King Solomon and the two mothers who dispute over whose son was the one that died during the night. See I Kings 3:16-28].

נותן לזה מנה ולזה מנה וכו' – that he said to them: you who were not particular together, and you did not suspect each other, lest his fellow would claim the two-hundred. I also do not deceive myself to be particular about who gets the two-hundred. And they make it as if they placed all three-hundred in one bundle/bag , so they would not have to be particular about what one party has in it and what his fellow has in it.

מה הפסיד הרמאי – for he will never admit the truth.

וכן שני כלים – For the Rabbis, it is necessary for him. For not only this, but also that are taught. Not that it is necessary for one to have a Maneh and the other to have two-hundred Maneh, for there is no loss through the breaking of a utensil, the rabbis said that he should give to this one a Maneh and to that one a Maneh, but even with two utensils where there is loss that it is necessary to break to larger utensil to give from it the monetary value of the smaller one, and when Elijah comes, it is found that the owner of the larger utensil loses when his utensil is broken. And I might think that in this the Sages agree with Rabbi Yosi that everything is left aside until Elijah will come, but it comes to teach us the exact opposite. And the Halakha is like the Sages.

אבודים – through mice or decay

If a man deposited produce with his fellow, even if it should perish he may not touch it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may sell it before a court of law, since he is like someone who returns a lost object to its owners.” In the scenario in our mishnah Reuven leaves his produce with Shimon to watch until he comes back. When Reuven doesn’t return for an extended period Shimon is left with a dilemma. On the one hand, a person guarding someone else’s possessions generally may not use the possessions. However, if he does nothing with the produce the produce will rot. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, Shimon should just leave the produce even at the risk of it perishing. The reason is that Reuven may want his produce back, since that was the produce he worked so hard to grow. If you have your own backyard garden you know that this is often true. Even if the fruit objectively is not better than the fruit in the store, to the person who grew it, it will taste better. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, better for Shimon to sell the produce and hold the money for the owner. This sale must be done in front of a court of law in order to prevent the person watching from selling the produce at too low of a price.

לא יגע בהן – to see them since each person wants his Kab from the nine Kabim of his fellow. His Kab is beloved to him because he had toiled for it, from the nine Kabim of others that he would purchase with their monetary value if he would sell them. And the Rabbis said that he should not touch them, for they have not lost other than up to the diminution that is explicitly mentioned in our Mishnah: for wheat and rice Nine half-Kabim to a Kor, etc. But if they lost more than their diminution [in value], the Sages agree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel that they sell them in the Jewish court. And the Halakha is according to the Sages.

המפקיד פירות אצל חבירו – and that which was deposited was combined with his produce and he was doubtful from them and did not know the measure of what he had consumed. And when he comes to restore them, he should take out the loss, deducting what they normally deduct [due to the produce 3consumed by mice].

When a man leaves produce for his fellow, [and his fellow returns it to the owner] he may exact reductions [due to natural depletion of the produce]. For wheat and rice, nine half kabs to the kor. For barley and durra nine kabs to the kor. For spelt and linseed three seahs to the kor.
All is in proportion to the quantity and according to the time [it is left]. Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri said: “But what do the mice care about [the quantity]? Won’t they eat [the same amount] whether there is a lot or a little? Rather, he may exact a reduction from only one kor.
Rabbi Judah says: “If the quantity was great he may not exact any reduction, since the produce increases in bulk.”
Mishnayoth seven and eight deal with the reductions in the quantity of certain deposited products (produce, wine, olive oil etc.) that a guardian is permitted to make when he returns the products to their owner.
In our mishnah Reuven left his produce with Shimon and is now coming back to reclaim it. Shimon need not return exactly that amount that Reuven left but is legally permitted to reduce some of the quantity, on the assumption that mice would have eaten some of the produce. The mishnah then proceeds to list how much can be reduced for different types of produce.
According to the anonymous opinion in section two the amounts listed in section one can be reduced for each kor (a measure of volume) for each year that the produce was left with Reuven. Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri raises a difficulty on this opinion. He points out that the mice will eat the same amount whether there is a lot or a little. In other words if there are 10 kor or 1 kor the mice will still eat only nine half kabs of wheat or rice. Therefore, according to Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri no matter how many kabs of produce there are, Shimon may only reduce from one of them.
Rabbi Judah states that if the amount of produce was large than Shimon may not reduce at all. According to Rabbi Judah, large amounts are measured in heaping imprecise measurements. Therefore the extra that was heaped on top of a strict measurement is enough to compensate for the loss to the mice.

תשעה חצאי קבין לכור – A Kor = 30 Seah and Seah = 6 Kabim.

הכל לפי הזמן – As such for each and every Kor.

הכל לפי הזמן – for each and every year he should duct for him such-an-amount

מה איכפת להו לעכברים – Such-[an-amount] they eat from a small portion just like from a large portion. Therefore, nine and one-half Kabim per year whether from a Kor or from ten Korim.

אם היתה מדה מרובה – that he deposited with him a lot, from ten korim and upwards, he should take out the losses.

מפני שהן מותירות – for during the days of the granary when they deposit the wheat which is dry, and in the rainy days, when they return it, it blows up. And regarding the consumption by mice, the loss is not so great for each Kor, the mice do not eat all that much from the ten Korim. Therefore, their blowing-up [in the rainy season], restores what the mice consume. And the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Yehuda nor according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri. And all of these measures are [what applies] in the Land of Israel and during the days of the Tannaim, but in other lands at these times, all is dependent upon what the seeds normally lose in that particular country and time.

יוציא לו שתות יין – if he deposited with him wine and it got combined with his, the wine vessel absorbs one-sixth.

With wine he may exact [a reduction] of one-sixth. Rabbi Judah says: “One-fifth.”
He may exact of him three logs in every one hundred logs of oil one log and a half for sediment and one log and a half for absorption. If the oil was refined he may not exact for sediment. If the jars were old he may not exact for absorption.
Rabbi Judah says: “Also if a man sells to his fellow through the year, the buyer must undertake to accept a reduction of one and a half logs because of sediment.
With wine and oil there are no reductions for mice, as there were with produce, but there are reductions due to sediment and absorption in the sides of the clay vessels which were used at the time. With wine the guardian may exact a reduction of one-sixth or one-fifth according to Rabbi Judah.
With regards to oil it depends on the type of jar and the type of oil. Regular oil is reduced 1½ per cent due to sediment, but refined oil does not produce any sediment and therefore reductions may not be exacted. Regulars jars absorb 1½ per cent but old jars, whose sides are more hardened and have already absorbed oil, do not absorb any oil. Therefore if the jars were old the guardian may not exact a reduction for absorption.
Rabbi Judah adds that not only may a guardian exact a reduction of 1½ per cent the oil returned to the owner, but so too may a person who sells refined oil. In other words if Reuven tells Shimon that he is selling him 100 logs of oil and then gives him refined oil, he only need give him 98 ½ logs since 1½ logs of regular oil would be worthless sediment anyway.

רבי יהודה אומר: חומש – since the ground from which they made the wine-vessels in the place of Rabbi Yehuda absorbed one-fifth. And everything is according to the place.

אף המוכר וכו' – Just as they said that there are lees with the depositor , so too they said regarding the seller. For one who sells oil to his fellow and always gives him from his barrels refined oil which is sufficient from him, the purchaser accepts upon himself to deduct from him a log-and-a-half from the walls of the sediment for every one-hundred log. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Yehuda.

לא יחדו לה הבעלים מקום – in the house of the bailee, to say to him: “lend me this corner.”

If a man left a jar with his fellow [to guard] and the owner did not assign it a special place [to be kept] and [the guardian] moved it and it broke: If it was broken while he was handling it: ( If for his own sake he is liable. ( If for the sake of the jar, he is not liable. But if it was broken after he had put it in place, whether he moved it for his own sake or for the sake of the jar, he is exempt.
If the owner had assigned it a special place, and the guardian moved it and it broke: Whether or not it broke while he was handling it or after he had put it in its place; ( If for his own sake he is liable, ( if for the sake of the jar, he is not liable.
Mishnayoth nine and ten deal with a guardian’s permission to use an object which he is watching and the subsequent liability for the object should it be damaged after he used it.
If a man left a jar with his fellow for safekeeping but did not specify the place for the jar to be kept, his fellow is allowed to move it, but only for the sake of the jar. For instance if his fellow did not tell him where to leave the jar, and he put it in the garage and then decided that the jar would be safer in the cellar he is allowed to move the jar to the cellar. In this case if the jar should break either while moving it or after having moved it and put it in a new place he will not be liable. However, if he moved the jar since he needed the space in the garage he takes a risk by moving it to the cellar. In this case if the jar breaks while moving it, he will be liable. However, since the owner did not specify where he wants the jar, once the jar is in its new place in the cellar, the guardian is no longer liable if the jar breaks.
If the owners did specify a place for the jar then he is not allowed to move it except for the sake of the jar. If he moved it for his own sake he will be liable, even after he put it down.
The following chart may help understand this mishnah.
Moved for sake of jar
Moved for sake of guardian
Owners specified place
Not obligated
Obligated
Owners did not specify place
Not obligated
Obligated if broken while handling
Not obligated if broken after being put down

לצרכו – to use it

לצרכה – that was in a place that it is close to being broken.

אם משהניחה – that he completed his usage [of it], he placed it in a well-guarded place. Whether he carried it initially for his own needs, whether he carried it for its needs, he is exempt, since we say from he returned it, it is in the owners’ domain as [it was] originally, and concerning it, he is nothing other than an unpaid bailee and is exempt from its unavoidable accidents. And even though he did not inform its owners to say, I took it and returned it. The first part of our Mishnah [is according to] Rabbi Yishmael who said regarding a person who stole a lamb from the flock and [later] returned it to its place, that he is exempt for we do not require the knowledge of the owners. And that which teaches that the owners did not specify a place for it as he returned it to its place after it was used for his needs, that he is exempt, and even though he did not inform the owners, he did return it to its designated/unique place. But even if the owners did not designate a specific/unique place, that when he returned it, it was not to the designated/unique place, he is exempt, for since he returned it to the protected/guarded place, that we did not require the knowledge of the owners.

ובין שהניחה לצרכו חייב – this end [of the Mishnah] is attributed to Rabbi Akiva, who said that a person who steals a lamb from a flock and returned it to its place and it met with an accident, he [i.e., the person who stole it] is always liable, until he informs the owners that he stole [the lamb] and returned [it]. And here also, after he used it for his own needs, and became a thief, regarding it, even though he left it (i.e., the lamb) in a guarded place. And that it is taught at the end [of the Mishnah] , “that the owners designated a particular place, we say that it was not necessary; it was not necessary that they did not designate that he is liable when he placed [the lamb], after he used it for his own needs, for he did not place it in the designated place for it, but even if they (i.e., the owners) designated a place, when he returned and put in its place, he is liable, for we require the knowledge of the owners. And the beginning of the Mishnah is [according to] Rabbi Yishmael and the end of the Mishnah is [according to] Rabbi Akiva. And this is how we establish it in the Gemara.

צררן – in his kerchief/scarf

If a man left money in his fellow’s keeping and his fellow bound it up and hung it over his back, or delivered it to his son or his daughter who were minors, or locked it up improperly, he is liable since he did not guard in the way of guardians. If he guarded it in the way of guardians he is exempt. This mishnah teaches how a person should guard another person’s given to him for safekeeping. He should not tie it up and put it in a bundle behind him lest a thief come and take it. He should not give it to minor children nor lock it up improperly. All of these are not the way that guardians watch other people’s objects. If he should act in such a manner and the money were to be lost he would be liable. If, however, he guarded it properly and something happened to the money, he would be exempt.

והפשילן לאחוריו – even though that this is high-level guarding, he is liable, for a person who carries deposited monies from place to place, they lack guarding other than in his hand, as it is written (Deuteronomy 14:24): “Wrap up the money (in your hand) [and take it with you to the place that the LORD your God has chosen].” Even though they are wrapped up, they will be “in your hand.” And if it is in the house, they lack [appropriate] guarding other than in the ground, or in the wall, in the handbreadth closest to the ceiling or the handbreadth closest to the ground. For it is not the manner of thieves to search there. But if he guarded it in another manner, he is negligent and liable, other than if initially, he made a condition with the depositor that for this condition he will accept the deposit, that he would not be liable for all of these forms of guardianship.

Questions for Further Thought:
Mishnah ten: Why does the mishnah need to teach the idea of “the way of guardians”? Why not just state that the guardian is either liable or not liable? What additional information might we glean from these words?

לבנו ולבתו הקטנים – but for adults, they take an oath that they guarded in the [appropriate] manner of bailees and are exempt. But we do not say regarding this that a bailee who transferred [the object] to another bailee is liable, for it is the way of a person to entrust what has been deposited in his hand – in the hand of his wife and his children. And all who make a deposit, with the knowledge that when he deposits something, that the one commissioned will give them into the hands of his wife and/or his children.

אם צרורין – and signed, or tied with a distinctive tie

Introduction The final two mishnayoth of chapter three continue to deal with the laws of things left in another person’s guard. Mishnah eleven deals with coins left for another person to guard. Mishnah twelve deals with a guardian who uses something deposited with him, even though he does not have permission to do so.

לא ישתמש בהן – but if they are not signed or tied with a distinctive tie, even though they are wrapped, they are as permissible and as if they were not tied at all, and it is permissible to use them.

This mishnah deals with two laws, one being directly related to the other. The first law is the legality of a guardian using coins deposited with him. The second is his responsibility if the coins were lost or stolen (in a case where the loss was not due to his negligence). The rule is that if the guardian has the right to use the coins than he is responsible if they are lost (even if he was not negligible with them).

חייב באחריותן – and even if they were not used, he is [considered] regarding them as a paid bailee, because he is able to use them, and he liable for theft and loss. And if they were used, he is like a lender towards it and he is liable even for unavoidable accidents.

Eleven
If a man left coins with a money-changer: If they were tied up [in a bag], he may not use them. ( Therefore, if they were lost, he is not responsible. If they were loose, he may use they were. ( Therefore, they were was lost, he is responsible. If a person leaves coins with a money-changer and the coins are tied up, assumedly the person does not want the money-changer to use the coins. Therefore he may not use them and is not responsible if they were lost. If, however, the coins were not tied up, the money-changer may use them. The fact that the owner left the coins with a money-changer who frequently needs coinage, means that the owner gave them to him assuming that the money-changer would use them. Since he may use the coins, he is responsible for their loss.

רבי יהודה אמר: כשולחני – and the Halakha is according to Rabbi Yehuda

[If a man left coins] with a householder, Whether they were loose or tied up, he may not use them. ( Therefore, if they were lost he his not responsible. A regular householder does not use coins nearly as much as a money-changer and therefore when the owner gives them to him he assumes that the householder will not use them. Therefore he cannot use them, even if they were loose. He is also not obligated if they are lost.

A shopkeeper is like a householder, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says a shopkeeper is like a money-changer. According to Rabbi Meir the laws regarding a shopkeeper are like those regarding a householder and according to Rabbi Judah they are like those regarding a money-changer.

Questions for Further Thought:
Mishnah eleven, section three: Explain the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah. Why does Rabbi Meir think that a shopkeeper is like a householder and Rabbi Judah think he is like a money-changer?

ילקה בחסר וביתר – from what the deposit is missing and/or how much it increased, such as the case where a person deposited with him a ewe/sheep laden with wool, or pregnant, and it was sheered or it gave birth after he misappropriated it/made illegitimate use of it, he pays for it and for its shorn wool or its offspring, and it results that he is flogged for how much it became [worth] less, or increased, for if it had become pregnant or laden with wool while she was with him, he pays for it as it was laden or pregnant as it is currently, and he is flogged for an increase/addition.

If a man makes personal use of a deposit: Bet Shammai holds that he is at a disadvantage whether the value rises or falls. Bet Hillel says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which he put it to use. Rabbi Akiva says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which it is claimed. A guardian who uses a deposit for his own personal use without having permission to do so is liable to pay back the entire deposit if the deposit should be broken or otherwise lost. The question asked is, at what value is he obligated to do so. For instance if someone left a gold watch worth $500 with him. If he uses the watch and it then breaks or is stolen, he must pay back a watch. However, what would be the law if the price of gold went down and the watch was only worth $400 or vice versa and the price was worth $600. According to Bet Shammai the guardian always pays the higher amount, whether that amount was the initial value or current value. According to Bet Hillel the guardian must pay according to the value of the object when the guardian first used it, whether or not that is the higher amount or not. According to Rabbi Akiva, he must always pay the value at the time of the claim, again whether or not that is the higher amount.

ובית הלל אומרים: כשעת הוצאה – From the house of the owners, and if is laden, it is laden, and if it is bare, bare.

One who expresses his intention to use a deposit [for personal use]: Bet Shammai says he is liable [for any subsequent damage to the deposit, as if he had already made use of it]. Bet Hillel says: He is not liable until he actually uses it, as it says (Exodus 22:7): “If he had not put his hand onto his neighbor’s property”. How is this so? (1) If he tilted the jug and took a quarter-log of wine and the jug was then broken, he only pays the quarter-log. (2) If he lifted it and then took a quarter-log and the jug was then broken, he pays for the whole jug. According to Bet Shammai, the guardian is liable for the object even if he doesn’t actually use the deposit but lets it be known that he is thinking about using it. From that moment on the deposit has become available to him and he is therefore liable to repay it if it should be lost (and even if he is not negligent). According to Bet Hillel he is only liable if he actually takes the object. How this happens is explained in the end of the mishnah. Tilting a jug but leaving it on the ground is not legally considered “taking possession” of the object in order to be fully obligated for it. In such a case he is only liable for what he took. Only if he actually picks it up and uses it will he be subsequently liable if it breaks and therefore liable for the whole jug.

רבי עקיבא אומר כשעת התביעה – as the deposit is (i.e., the condition of the animal) at the time that of its appearance in court, as it is written (Leviticus 5:24): “…He shall pay it to its owner when he realizes his guilt.” He shall give like he is on the day of his guilt, on the day when he is found guilty in court. And the Halakha is according to the School of Hillel.

Questions for Further Thought:
Mishnah twelve, section one: Explain the reasoning behind Bet Shammai, Bet Hillel and Rabbi Akiva’s statements. How do they each differ from one another?

החושב לשלוח יד בפקדון – he said in in the presence of witnesses, “I will take his the deposit of so-and-so for myself.”

בית שמאי מחייבים – As it is written (Exodus 22:8): “In all charges of misappropriation –[pertaining to an ox, an ass, a sheep, a garment, or any other loss, whereof one party alleges, ‘This is it,’]…” from the time that he spoke to misappropriate, he is considered negligent.

עד שישלח בו יד – As it is written (Exodus 22:7): “…that he has not laid hands on the other’s property.” And this, “In all charges of misappropriation” (Exodus 22:8), the School of Hillel expounds upon this. He says to his servant or to his agent to misappropriate the deposit. Froom when is he liable? There is a teaching in the Scriptural text to intimate, the text reads: “In all charges of misappropriation” (Exodus 22:8).

כיצד? הטה את החבית – Now he explains the words of the School of Hillel, and there are books which don’t read "כיצד"/how? And it is a matter for itself.

ונשברה – after a time

אינו משלם אלא רביעית – misappropriation does not make one liable for unavoidable accidents until he takes possession by drawing/seizing an object or lift it up which is acquisition.

הגביהה ונטל – not exactly took, for when it is lifted up in order to to take [something], he is liable for an unavoidable accident, even if he didn’t take anything from it. But if he took a fourth of a Log (a LOG = 6 eggs in volume) from the barrel, and the rest of the wine in the barrel fermented afterwards, even though he did not lift the barrel up, he pays for all the wine, for he caused the wine to ferment, and it is his act that helped it [get sour] (see Bava Metzia 44a).