Комментарий к Бава Кама 2:13

In which manner is it that the leg is accustomed to break in its way of walking... The main idea of this whole type of damage, that it is all damage that comes from an animal while it is doing what it's accustomed to do all the time or most of the time. This is the case that is said about it that it is normal and full damages are paid. And that which is not normal, that there will be in it a thing that it did that was uncommon for it, or that it came through an intermediary of another action, and the animal, the one that did that deed, was not the primary catalyst, for this he's obligated in half damages and this is the half damage he's obligated in for pebbles that shoot out from under his feet. That he pays (is assessed for) the full amount of damage, as it's explained in the 8th perek of this tractate. And the explanation of 'a bucket'- a thing that was tied to its foot or it was jumping and digs its feet into the ground. And this the chicken does more than other birds.

כיצד הרגל מועדת – meaning to say, in which manner does the foot become forewarned? And it answers to break something while it is walking. As such it is forewarned when it smashes utensils while it is walking.

How is the leg [of a beast] an attested danger to break [what it tramples upon] as it walks along? A beast is an attested danger [only] in so far as it goes along in its usual way and breaks [an object]. If it kicked, or if small stones were tossed out from beneath its feet and it thus broke other vessels, one pays half damages. If it trampled upon a vessel and broke it, and this [broken vessel] fell upon another vessel and broke it, for the first one pays full damages and for the other half damages.
Fowls (chickens and are an attested danger in so far as they go along in their usual way and break [objects]. But if the fowl had its feet entangled, or if it was jumping and it thereby broke any vessel one pays half damages.
This mishnah deals with damages done by an animal through trampling. We learned in the mishnah at the end of chapter one that when an animal causes damages in a usual manner, meaning it is an attested danger (muad) for that damage, the owner is obligated to make full restitution. However, if the damages are done in an unusual manner, for which the animal is an unattested danger (tam), the owner is only obligated to make half restitution. This mishnah continues to deal with these concepts with regards to damages done by trampling.
The first section of the mishnah deals with damages done by a beast, meaning a domesticated animal, cow, sheep or goat, by trampling on another object. If the damage is done in an anticipated, usual manner, the owner is obligated for full damages. She should have watched over her animal, and since she did not, she is obligated to make full restitution. Section 1c brings up a strange circumstance whereby with one action the animal damages two vessels. For the first vessel the owner is obligated for full restitution and for the second vessel only half restitution.
The second section of the mishnah basically states that the same is generally true for damages done by fowl. They too are attested dangers to damage while walking in their usual manner. Section 2a brings up special circumstances in which the fowl damaged in an unusual way, and therefore the owner is only obligated for half restitution.

הבהמה מועדת – the first part [of the Mishnah] teaches chief actionable damages of the “foot” that she treaded on with her feet, and the concluding part [of the Mishnah] teaches derivates that the animal is forewarned to walk in her manner and to bread with her body and with her hair and the sliding pouch that is upon her while she is walking.

או שהיו צרורות מנתזין – even though it is not a change, but rather, the way things happen, nevertheless, half-damages and not more, for this is the normative Halakha for this and we are speaking about the domain of the person who suffered the damages, but in the public domain, he is exempt [from damages] for pebbles are a derivative of the “foot” to make them exempt in the public domain.

ונפל על כלי אחר – these are the first damages of the “foot” and she (i.e., its owner) pays full damages and the latter are through broken pebbles, therefore, half-damage.

דליל קשור ברגלו – everything that is attacked onto the foot of the chicken is called is דליל/anything irregularly wound/entangled, and there are those who have the reading דלי/bucket.

מהדס – (scratch) to dance, and there are those who interpret it as digging with its feet in the earth in the manner of chickens.

משלם חצי נזק – that is entangled/irregularly wound that is pebbles are judged as pebbles on the utensils, and incisions/scratches also, such as that pebbles that were tossed and they broke the utensils.

How is the tooth accustomed to eat what is appropriate for it... What that it says in what matters is this said returns upon what that it said it eats fruits or vegetables, but eating garments or vessels in the public domain obligates in half damages since it is the way of people to place garments or vessels in the public domain for when they are needed. And the explanation of what that it benefits, that he pays for items which are appropriate for its portion of eating from things it's normal for the animal to eat, for example, a donkey that ate 10 liters of dates, the master pays for the donkey the value of 10 liters of barley. And if it was the price of barley was more he pays the value of the dates alone, and like this is the way to evaluate and judge. And when it was placed in the midst of the market and turned to the side and ate, then he pays what he damaged.

כיצד השן מועדת – in what manner is it “forewarned?” And it answers: to eat what is is appropriate for it.

How is the tooth [of a beast] an attested danger to eat that which it is fit to consume? A beast is an attested danger to eat fruit and vegetables. [If however] it ate clothing or utensils [the owner] pays only half damages.
When does this apply? [This applies] in the domain of the damaged party But if it was within the public domain, the owner is not liable.
If [the beast] benefited, [the owner] pays what it benefited.
How does [the owner] pay what [the animal] benefited? [If it ate] from the middle of the marketplace, [the owner] pays what [the animal] benefited. [If it ate] from the sides of the marketplace, [the owner] pays for the damage [the animal] did. [If it ate] from in front of the store [the owner] pays for what [the animal] benefited. [If it ate] from inside the store [the owner] pays for the damage [the animal] did.
The previous mishnah taught us the laws dealing with damages done by an animal’s “regel” leg through walking (trampling). This mishnah teaches damages done by an animal’s “shen” or tooth. Note that the mishnah does not deal with vicious biting by an animal but with an animal that damages by eating. The laws in this mishnah are related to Exodus 22:4 which speaks of a crop-destroying beast. Our mishnah will deal with several issues: 1) what does an animal eat, thereby causing its owner to become liable; 2) differences in liability based on where the animal eats; 3) two different levels of liability, a greater level in which the owner is obligated to pay the actual cost of damages, and a lesser level in which the owner pays that which the animal actually benefited.
There are really three parts to the mishnah. The first section tells us that an owner is only liable when an animal eats things that an animal normally eats. For instance, if my dog goes into your house and eats your cupcakes, I am liable. However, if he eats your mail, I am liable only for half damages.
The second section deals with where the damages are done. I am liable when my animal goes onto your property to damage. I am not liable if you carelessly leave your things in the public domain and my animal eats them. However, the end of the mishnah returns and refines this clause. If you leave things on the side of the public domain, that is not considered careless and the owner of the damaging animal would be liable.
Finally, in sections three and four we introduce a new type of payment, compensation for that which the animal benefited and not for the damage done. For instance if you leave an expensive cut of steak in the public domain and my animal eats it the damages may be 100 dollars. However, since I would not feed my animal steak, rather I would usually feed her cheap dog food, I am only obligated for the amount of dog food that I will now not have to feed her, since she already ate. Paying for the benefit is usually much less that the actual damages.
You should note the highly formulaic nature of this mishnah. It teaches many laws but uses few words. (This is especially true in the Hebrew. In the English I have added words to make the mishnah read better). The mishnah repeats the same structures and phrases over and over again, as does the previous mishnah. Remember, this is oral law, recited and memorized orally. Having repeated structures and few words makes the mishnah much easier to remember and repeat.
Questions for further thought:
 What is the difference between in front of the store and in the store? From this mishnah, can you imagine how their stores were set up?
 What might the law be if I did regularly feed my dog expensive steak?
 What might the law be if my dog is accustomed to eating shoes, and he goes onto your property and eats your shoes?

משלם חצי נזק – for it is unusual (to eat clothing or chew up utensils).

בד"א וכו' - it refers to when it eats fruits or vegetables that are in the public domain, it is exempt, for we require (Exodus 22:4): “When a man lets his livestock loose to graze in another’s land,” but if it ate clothing or utensils, even in the public domain it is liable one-half damages, for people generally put clothing and utensils in the public domain according to the hour and it is the “horn” in the domain of the person suffering damages and he is liable.

משלם מה שנהנית – these are not valid payments but rather if it ate something that its value was great, we view it as if they barley, and he doesn’t pay anything other than the value of the barley at its cheapest, which is a full third less than what they are sold for in the marketplace. But, if it ate something whose worth is less than the barley, he pays the worthy of that thing that it ate at its cheapest, and if it (i.e., the animal) ate that which he damaged such as that it ate the wheat but since it did not benefit, it [the owner] is exempt [from payment].

מצדד הרחבה משלם מה שהזיקה – if it (i.e., the animal) stood and at the sides of the road in a place where it is not the manner of bulls to walk there, it is not compared to the public domain, and it pays what it damages.

A dog or a goat jumped from a roof etc... A thin cake and sometimes that coals attach to it. And When they are eaten in the field and they ignite the field with that coal, behold in his eating of the cake he is acting normal and he pays full damages. And for lighting the field, it's different, and therefore he pays half damages. (other versions translate differently- saying he pays half because it is pebbles).

מפני שהן מועדין – to jump, and we are speaking of in the domain of the one who suffered damages, for it is a derivative of the “foot.”

If a dog or a goat jumped from a roof and broke vessels, [the owner] must pay full damages, since they are attested dangers.
A dog that took a cake [while there was a cinder attached] and went to a stack of grain and ate the cake and burned the stack of grain, For the cake [the owner] pays full damages And for the stack of grain [the owner] pays half damages.
This mishnah deals with damages done by either dogs or goats. The important principle to remember when reading this mishnah is that a person is obligated full damages when the damager is an attested danger (muad) and only half damages when the damager is an unattested danger (tam). One is obligated to guard animals in one’s possession which attested dangers and therefore if one fails to do so, the restitution which must be made is higher. Furthermore, we have learned several times already, that animals can be muad for those actions which they are likely to do and tam for those that they are unlikely to do. For instance in the previous mishnah we learned that an ox is muad to eat grain but tam to eat clothing. Over the first the ox’s owner will pay full damages and over the second half damages.
Evidently dogs and goats were likely to damage by jumping off roofs. Therefore, there owner must prevent them from doing so and if she fails, she is obligated to pay full damages.
In the second section of the mishnah we learn that dogs are likely to eat cake (I know my dog is!), but unlikely to burn down stacks of standing grain. Therefore for the cake one is obligated for full damages and for the stack only half damages.
Questions For Further Thought
 Is there a new principle which we are learning from the second clause of the mishnah? In other words, what might you have thought had not this clause been taught?

על החררה משלם נזק שלם – for this is the “tooth” in the domain of the one who suffered damages.

ועל הגדיש משלם חצי נזק – they are like pebbles, and the decided Halakha is that he should pay one-half damages.

Which is unaccustomed and which is accustomed: 'Touching' implies touching it and pulling it and it does not gore. And the halacha is like Rav Yehuda in the explanation of the accustomed ox and the halacha is like Rav Meir in the explanation of a simple ox. And all the time that the ox is accustomed to gore it does not return to its unaccustomed status until that children can play with it and it does not damage by goring.

משיחזור בו שלשה ימים – when he sees bulls and they are not goring, they return to the innocuous state.

Which kind of animal is accounted harmless ( and which is an attested danger (? An attested danger is one that people have given testimony about [that it damaged] for three days. A harmless one is one that has refrained from damage for three days. This is according to Rabbi Judah.
Rabbi Meir says, An attested danger is one that people have given testimony about three times. A harmless one is one that children can touch and it will not gore.
We have several times already discussed the two types of danger: a muad which is an attested danger and a tam, which is harmless, meaning something that is not expected to cause damages. However, we have mostly discussed the different consequences of being a muad or being a tam. The owner of a muad that causes damage will pay full damages from the best of his land while the owner of a tam that damages will only pay half damages which cannot exceed the value of the damaging animal (see Mishnah 1:4). This mishnah discusses how an animal can move from the status of a tam to the status of a muad and vice versa, how an animal that is muad can revert to the status of tam.
In this mishnah we see a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah, two of the most prevalent Rabbis in the Mishnah. According to Rabbi Judah in order for a tam animal to become muad people must testify against the animal on three different days. However, according to Rabbi Meir it is enough that people testify against the animal three times on one day for it to become a muad.
Similarly the Rabbis dispute how a muad would revert to being a tam. According to Rabbi Judah all it would need is three days, in which it had the opportunity to gore and yet it didn’t do so. However, according to Rabbi Meir it needs to be harmless enough for children to touch. Otherwise it remains a muad.

שלשה פעמים – and even on one day (i.e., doing damage thrice on one day), but the Halakha is not according to Rabbi [Meir] for they are not forewarned until they testify about it for three days.

ממשמשים בו – they pull at it and play with it and it doesn’t gore. And in this, the Halakha is according [to Rabbi Meir] that a forewarned bull does not return to its innocuous state until small children play with it [and it doesn’t gore].

An ox that damages in the domain of the damager, how is this? It pushes… When it's learned out one law from another with 'lesser to severe' exegesis, It should not be that what we derive (has a penalty) is greater than what we learn from, rather it should be like it. And this is what it says 'it's enough that what comes from the ruling (the exegesis) to be like the ruling'. And there is not in this a disagreement because this is from the Torah, that it says with Miriam 'and if her father spits in her face, would she not be embarrassed for 7 days', all the more so for the divine presence. That if the father gets angry with her she separates from him for seven days, all the more so he who God may his name be blessed gets angry at, that it's appropriate that he be isolated for more days, however, the verse says to isolate for 7 days, behold, there, the law of the divine presence which is learned from the father is like the law of the father. And thus the main point of disagreement of Rav Tarfon and the sages is this, that since Rav Tarfon says at the end, what that we say 'it's enough that what comes from the ruling (the exegesis) to be like the ruling', that when we want to obligate this thing which we learned out from another law that we did not learn out previously, and thus there will not be in it a ruling greater than the ruling from which we learned it out from. Like that we learned that when the divine presence is angry she secludes for 7 days and this thing was not known before this, however, that when there will be by us a known law of one of these things like half damages, and after that we learn this with a lesser to more severe exegesis, if it does not add to the law and obligate to pay full damages, it will be that this exegesis is in vain and does not add a thing to our knowledge, that this half damage was known without a lesser to more severe exegesis. And in a case like this, we do not say 'it's enough that what comes from the ruling (the exegesis) to be like the ruling' because there does not come a ruling, rather half damages are known. And the sages say even in a case like this, we say 'it's enough that what comes from the ruling (the exegesis) to be like the ruling' since it does not come from a ruling, rather we know it was (half) damage [other editions remove from 'Since']. And thus I explained to you this idea that it should not rise in your mind that Rabbi Tarfon does not hold by this rule ('it's enough...') in other places since he believes like this in this place alone, that he does not hold by this as we explained. And the halakha is like the sages.

נגח נגף [וכו'] – all of them are derivatives of the horn.

“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages.
But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.”
Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
This mishnah deals with one of the clauses from mishnah four of chapter one, which stated that the owner of an ox that damages on the property of the damaged party is obligated for full damages. If the same ox had committed this type of damage in the public domain the owner would only be obligated half damages. However, since a person should be extra careful when they bring their animal onto another person’s property the owner is more liable. Being a father of two little children, the following, albeit imperfect analogy, comes to mind. If I bring an expensive toy over to my son’s friend’s house, and one of the children breaks it, I believe I am at fault. However, if someone brings their child over to my house, and breaks something I believe that they should be at fault. There are many more analogies that one could make; this was just an example.
One important note with regards to learning the mishnah. We will see a dispute between the sages and Rabbi Tarfon, and as part of this dispute the sages will state that, “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred.” This principle means that when you learn a law regarding one situation from a law regarding a similar situation, the inferred law does not need to be stricter than the original law from which it was inferred. This principle is learned from Numbers 12:14 where God punishes Miriam for speaking against Moses. God says, “If her father spat in her face, would she not bear her shame for seven days? Let her be shut out of camp for seven days.” God says that had her father rebuked her, Miriam would have been punished for seven days. One might have thought that God’s rebuke would carry an even more serious consequence. The Torah teaches us the aforementioned principle that the inferred law, the length of Miriam’s punishment when God rebukes her, is not stricter than the law from which it was inferred, the length of Miriam’s punishment had her father rebuked her.
This is a long mishnah and is not a simple one, but we will try in any case to explain briefly. The sages and Rabbi Tarfon argue at length whether an ox that gores or does some other unusual form of damage in the private domain of the one who is injured would be obligated full or half damages. Rabbi Tarfon’s initial argument in section 3 is based on the following chart.
Public Domain
Private domain of him that is injured
Horn
Half damages
Acc. to Rabbi Tarfon full damages.
Foot and tooth
Exempt
Full damages
Rabbi Tarfon claims that since we are lenient on damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain and yet strict in the private domain, we should also be strict in the private domain on damages caused by the horn, since after all we were relatively strict in the public domain. The other sages reply that by the means of this type of logical argument one cannot extend the liability for damages caused by the horn, beyond what we already know, that one is liable for half damages.
Rabbi Tarfon’s second argument in section 4 is a different variation on his first argument. He claims that he is not learning liability for damages done by the horn in the private domain from damages done by the horn in the public domain. Rather he emphasizes that he is learning from damages done by the foot and tooth in the private domain, in which case one should not say that one cannot extend the liability, as the sages argued with him. Again the sages reply with the same reply they gave in section 3a. In their opinion, no matter how you phrase it, Rabbi Tarfon’s argument is based on the relative strictness of damages done by the horn in the public domain. Since this is so, the law cannot be extended further by an argument based on logic.

דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון – the “horn” in the domain of the one who suffered damages that you bring from the law of the “horn” in the public domain, and as you have said regarding the horn which [the Rabbis] were stringent about it in the public domain, does it not follow logically that we should be strict with it in the domain of the one who supported the damages. It is sufficient that it (i.e., the inferred law) should be like that of the premise, like the horn in the public domain, and not be liable in the domain of the one who suffered damages other than one-half damages just as he is liable in the private domain.

אני לא אדון קרן מקרן – as we stated above, but rather the “horn” from the “foot.” The place where he was stringent upon him with the “tooth” and the “foot” does it not follow logically that we should be stringent with the “horn?”

דיו לבא מן הדין – for finally, if it is not the “horn” in the public domain, you will not find a side for an a-minori/a-majori. And Rabbi Tarfon, although that in general, he holds that it is enough for it is from the Torah as it is written (Numbers 12:14): “Would she not bear her shame for seven days?” All the more so for God’s presence for fourteen days, but it is enough if the inferred law be as strict as the premise, therefore, “she should be shut out of the camp for seven days” (Numbers 12:14) and no more than that. Nevertheless, here, he does not hold that it is enough for Rabbi Tarfon holds that when we state that it is enough where he didn’t refute an a-minori/a-majori such as there (i.e., Numbers 12:14) of the seven days of God’s Divine presence is not written [in the Biblical verse], the Kal V’Homer brings fourteen. The “it is enough” comes to exclude seven and to establish seven since it mentions this Kal V’Homer for these seven that has been established and it doesn’t refute it completely. But here, the half-damages are written, whether for the public domain or whether in the courtyard of the one who suffered damages, and the Kal V’aHomer comes and brings another one-half damage and makes it full damages. If he had expounded on the “it is enough” and you established ait as high-damages as at the beginning, I would raise to him the objection of the Kal V’Homer and not benefit from it at all. But the Rabbis hold that even where they raise the objection of the Kal V’Homer, we state it as “it is enough” and the Halakha is according to the Sages.

A man is accustomed always, whether by accident or intentional etc... Like that a person is sleeping and comes another and sleeps at his side, the second is accustomed with regard to the first. And if the second damages the first, he's obligated (to pay damages). And if the first damages, that he was asleep first the other who came to sleep at his side, he is exempt. And if the two lay down together, all who do damage from them to their friend are obligated, since they are both accustomed to each other.

בין ער בין ישן – if he was sleeping and another [person] came and slept at his side, and he second damaged the first, he is liable, but if he first [person] damaged the second, he is exempt [from punishment]. But if they slept together, each one of them who caused damage to his fellow is liable, because of them are considered as forewarned regarding each other.

Introduction This mishnah deals with damages caused by a human being, a topic that was mentioned briefly in chapter one mishnah four. There we learned that a person was always considered to be muad, or an attested danger. This mishnah explains deals with that concept, that a human being is a muad.

סימא את עין חבירו – even inadvertently, he is liable for damages, but not for four things (see Talmud Bava Kamma 26a-b), for [the Torah] does not declare him liable for four things other than wanton action, or something close to wanton action.

Human beings are always an attested danger, whether the damage is caused inadvertently or deliberately, whether the person who caused the damage is awake or asleep. If a man blinded his fellow’s eye or broke his utensils he must pay full damages. A person who damages is always considered to be a muad, attested danger, and as such he will always pay full damages. The idea is that a person cannot claim that something was accidental and thereby exempt herself from culpability. For instance if I throw something heavy out my window and it hits someone’s car, I cannot claim that it was an accident and that I didn’t mean to do it. Even if I go to sleep next to something that belongs to someone else, and in my sleep I roll over and break the item, I will always be obligated. Questions for further thought: Why should a human being always be a muad? Why not exempt her when she causes damages inadvertently?