Si quelqu'un fait une condition contraire à ce qui est écrit dans la Torah, sa condition est nulle. [Toute cette Michna est en accord avec R. Meir, qui soutient que si quelqu'un fait une condition contraire à ce qui est écrit dans la Torah, même en ce qui concerne les questions d'argent, sa condition est nulle. Ce n'est pas la halakha. Mais, en matière monétaire, même si l'on fait une condition contraire à ce qui est écrit dans la Torah, sa condition demeure.] Et toute condition précédée d'un acte est nulle. [S'il a précédé l'acte prévu à la condition désirée, par exemple: «Ceci est à vous, si vous faites ceci et cela» (la condition est nulle). Car ce n'est pas comme la condition des fils de Gad et des fils de Reuven, à savoir. (Nombres 32:29): "S'ils passent ... alors tu donneras, etc." où la condition précède l'acte.] Et quelle que soit la (condition) qui peut être remplie à la fin, s'il la stipule au début, [la condition étant précédée de l'acte], la condition tient. [Mais s'il n'est pas possible de remplir la condition, la condition est nulle et l'acte tient. Car (en posant cette condition impossible), il ne fait qu'hyperboliser, pas vraiment l'intention de la condition, mais seulement désireux de narguer et d'aiguiller son voisin avec des mots.]
Tosefta Kiddushin
(Translated from the Ehrfurt manuscript:) Any stipulation which has the action at the beginning, such a stipulation is invalid. How so? [If he, the brother-in-law whose brother died, said to her, his dead brother's wife,] "Now that I have released you from the levirate bond, with the understanding that my father is happy about it", even if his father doesn't want this—she is divorced [since he already released her with halitzah]. "Now that I have had sex with you, [be betrothed to me] with the understanding that my father is happy about it", even if his father doesn't want this—she is betrothed [since they already had sex, the stipulation is void]. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehudah says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father wants it—she is betrothed, for she only had sex because of that original condition. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar had a pneumonic: Any stipulation which is possible to do oneself or with an agent and he stipulated about it—his stipulation stands; but any stipulation that is impossible to do except with his body and he stipulated about it—his stipulation is void. How so? "Behold I divorce you with the understanding that my father is happy about it", if the father wants it—she is divorced; but if he doesn't want it—she is not divorced. "Behold I betroth you with the understanding that my father is happy about it", if the father wants it—she is betrothed; but if he doesn't want it—she is not betrothed.
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Tosefta Ketubot
Rabbi Yehudah says: [The husband] can always eat the fruits' fruit [i.e. the interest's interest, even if he said in the ketubah that he gives up access to the fruit from her property]. How so? He can sell the fruit and buy with [that money] land, and he can eat the fruit. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yohanan ben Berokah say: If she dies, he inherits it [the fruit, even if he said he wouldn't have access to it in the ketubah], for she made a stipulation against what was written in the Torah and anyone who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is null and void.
