Talmud for Sanhedrin 9:2

נִתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה וְהָרַג אֶת הָאָדָם, לַנָּכְרִי וְהָרַג אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל, לִנְפָלִים, וְהָרַג בֶּן קְיָמָא, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל מָתְנָיו וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל לִבּוֹ, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל לִבּוֹ וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל מָתְנָיו וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית הַגָּדוֹל וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַקָּטָן וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַקָּטָן, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַקָּטָן וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַקָּטָן וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַגָּדוֹל וְלֹא הָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַגָּדוֹל, וָמֵת, פָּטוּר. אֲבָל נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית עַל מָתְנָיו וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל לִבּוֹ, וָמֵת, חַיָּב. נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַכּוֹת אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְהָיָה בָהּ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל הַקָּטָן, וָמֵת, חַיָּב. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, אֲפִלּוּ נִתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת זֶה וְהָרַג אֶת זֶה, פָּטוּר:

If one's intent were to kill a beast and he killed a man; a gentile and he killed a Jew; a premature child (who would not survive) and he killed one who would have survived, he is not liable. If his intent were to strike him a non lethal blow on his hips, and it went to his heart, where it was lethal, and he died, he is not liable. [For both must be satisfied: that he intend to kill and that the blow be sufficient to kill.] If his intent were to strike him a lethal blow on his heart, where it would be lethal, and it went to his hips, where it was not sufficient to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If his intent were to strike an adult, but the blow would not suffice to do so, and it went to a child, where it would suffice, and he died, he is not liable. If his intent were to strike a child, and the blow would suffice to kill him, and it went to an adult, whom it would not suffice to kill, and he died, he is not liable. But if his intent were to strike one on his hips, where the blow would suffice to kill him, and it went to his heart and he died, he is liable. If his intent were to strike an adult, whom the blow would suffice to kill, and it went to a child, who died, he is liable. R. Shimon says: Even if his intent were to kill one and he killed another, he is not liable. [This does not refer to the latter statement of the first tanna, viz.: "If his intent were to strike an adult, whom the blow would suffice to kill, and it went to a child, who died, he is liable"; for if it did, it should simply have been stated: "R. Shimon says that he is not liable." And why repeat: "Even if his intent were to kill one and he killed another, etc."? The first tanna states this explicitly. Why the "Even"? R. Shimon, rather, refers to the first statement, viz.: "If one's intent were to kill a beast and he killed a man, he is not liable," the implication being that if it were his intent to kill a man and he killed another man, he is liable. It is in this regard that R. Shimon says: "Even if his intent were to kill one and he killed another, he is not liable." The halachah is in accordance with R. Shimon.]

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