Related%20passage for Bava Kamma 2:5

שׁוֹר הַמַּזִּיק בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק כֵּיצַד. נָגַח, נָגַף, נָשַׁךְ, רָבַץ, בָּעַט, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק. בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים חֲצִי נֶזֶק. אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, וּמַה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהֵקֵל עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר, הֶחְמִיר עֲלֵיהֶם בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק לְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, מְקוֹם שֶׁהֶחְמִיר עַל הַקֶּרֶן בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, לְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁנַּחְמִיר עָלֶיהָ בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק לְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן, מַה בִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אַף בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק חֲצִי נֶזֶק. אָמַר לָהֶם, אֲנִי לֹא אָדוּן קֶרֶן מִקֶּרֶן, אֲנִי אָדוּן קֶרֶן מֵרֶגֶל. וּמַה בִמְקוֹם שֶׁהֵקֵל עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, הֶחְמִיר בַּקֶּרֶן, מְקוֹם שֶׁהֶחְמִיר עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל, בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁנַּחְמִיר בַּקֶּרֶן. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן, מַה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אַף בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק חֲצִי נֶזֶק:

"An ox that damages in the domain of the nizak" (1:4). How so? If it gored, butted, bit, lay down, or kicked, [all toldoth of keren] — In the public domain, he pays a half-nezek; in the domain of the nizak, R. Tarfon says he pays a full nezek, and the sages say a half-nezek. R. Tarfon said to them: Now if in a place where (Scripture) was lenient with shen and regel — in the public domain — where they are exempt, (Scripture) was stringent with them in the domain of the nizak, making them pay a full nezek — then, in a place where (Scripture) was (relatively) stringent with keren — in the public domain — making it pay a half-nezek, does it not follow that we should be stringent with it in the domain of the nizak and make it pay a full nezek! They said to him: It is sufficient that what is derived from a law be like the law it is derived from. Just as in the public domain (he pays) a half-nezek, so in the domain of the nizak (he pays) a half-nezek. [Keren in the domain of the nizak, which you derive from the law of keren in the public domain, saying: "Keren, with which Scripture was stringent in the public domain, does it not follow that we should be stringent with it in the domain of the nizak" — it is sufficient that it be as (stringent) as the law it is derived from, keren in the public domain, and that it be liable for only a half-nezek in the domain of the nizak as it is in the public domain.] He said to them: I shall not derive keren from keren: [as above, but] I shall derive keren from regel. [In a place where Scripture was stringent with shen and regel, does it not follow that we should be stringent with keren, viz.:] Now if in a place where (Scripture) was lenient with shen and regel — in the public domain — it was stringent with keren — then in a place where it was stringent with shen and regel — in the domain of the nizak — does it not follow that we should be stringent with keren! They said to him: It is sufficient that what is derived from a law be as (stringent) as the law it is derived from. Just as in the public domain (he pays) a half-nezek, so in the domain of the nizak (he pays) a half-nizak. [For in the last analysis, if not for keren in the public domain, the a fortiori argument (kal vachomer) could not be constructed. And R. Tarfon, even though he holds that "It is sufficient, etc." is a Scriptural principle, viz. (Numbers 12:14): "And if her father had spat in her face, would she not be humiliated for seven days!" — a fortiori, vis-à-vis the Shechinah, fourteen days! — but it is sufficient that what is derived from a law be as (stringent) as the law itself, for which reason she is confined for seven days and not more — still, in our instance R. Tarfon does not hold that "It is sufficient, etc." obtains, holding that it applies only where the a fortiori argument is not refuted, as in the above instance, where the seven days of the Shechinah not being written, the a fortiori argument is adduced for fourteen-day liability, and "It is sufficient, etc." removes seven and leaves seven, so that the a fortiori argument is found to establish seven-day liability and is not entirely refuted. But here, where, Scripture prescribes a half-nezek both for the public domain and the domain of the nizak, and the a fortiori argument is adduced for an additional half-nezek, making it a full nezek — if "It is sufficient, etc." were posited and payment were established as a half-nezek as in the beginning, the a fortiori argument would have been entirely refuted, availing naught. And the rabbis hold that even in such an instance, "It is sufficient, etc." is posited. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]

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