Wenn man sich eine Kuh geliehen hat: Wenn man sie für einen halben Tag ausgeliehen und für einen halben Tag gemietet hat; wenn er es für diesen Tag ausgeliehen und für den nächsten Tag gemietet hat; wenn er einen anstellte und einen auslieh, und er starb—Der Kreditgeber sagt: Der Ausgeliehene ist gestorben; an dem Tag, für den es ausgeliehen wurde, starb es; In der Zeit (dh dem Teil des Tages), für den es ausgeliehen wurde, starb es [und Sie haften für den Unfall], und der andere sagt: Ich weiß nicht [dh vielleicht ist der Angestellte gestorben, und ich bin nicht haftungsunfähig], haftet er. [Diese Mischna kann nicht so verstanden werden, wie sie ist, denn das Urteil lautet: Wenn einer sagt: "Du schuldest mir eine Manah und der andere sagt:" Ich weiß nicht ", schwört er einen konsuetudinalen Eid (shvuath zögert), dass er es nicht tut wissen, und er haftet nicht. Deshalb interpretiert die Gemara den Fall als einen, in dem er zu ihm sagt: "Ich habe dir zwei Kühe gegeben, eines Tages zum Ausleihen; neulich eingestellt werden, und beide starben in der Ausleihezeit "— und der andere sagt: "Einer starb in der Ausleihzeit; der andere weiß ich nicht" —er gibt einen Teil (des Anspruchs) zu und haftet für einen Eid (dass er den anderen Teil nicht schuldet), und da er nicht schwören kann (nicht weiß), zahlt er. Dies ist vergleichbar mit dem Sprichwort des einen: "Du schuldest mir hundert" und dem Sprichwort des anderen: "Ich weiß (dass ich dir etwas schulde) fünfzig, und ich weiß nicht (wenn ich dir noch etwas schulde) fünfzig", in welchem Fall er haftet für einen Eid, und da er nicht schwören kann, zahlt er.] Wenn der Mieter sagt: Der Angestellte ist gestorben; an dem Tag, für den es eingestellt wurde, starb es; In der Zeit (dh dem Teil des Tages), für die es eingestellt wurde, starb es—und der andere sagt: Ich weiß nicht, er haftet nicht. Wenn einer sagt: Der Ausgeliehene (gestorben) und der andere: Der Angestellte (gestorben), schwört der Mieter, dass der Angestellte gestorben ist. [Auch dies kann in seiner jetzigen Form nicht verstanden werden, denn das Urteil besagt, dass der eine, wenn er Weizen beansprucht und der andere Gerste zugibt, nicht haftet—sogar für Gerste. Und auch hier wurde nicht behauptet, was zugelassen wurde, und was behauptet wurde, wurde nicht zugelassen. Welchen Platz gibt es dann für diesen Eid! Die Gemara interpretiert dies daher als einen Fall eines Eides durch Gilgul ("Rollen"), wobei der eine zum anderen sagt: "Schwöre mir den Eid der Wächter, für den du verantwortlich bist, dass er eines natürlichen Todes gestorben ist , "und da er diesen Eid ablegt, leistet er auch den anderen durch Gilgul, dass der Angestellte gestorben ist.] Wenn einer sagt, ich weiß es nicht, und der andere sagt, ich weiß es nicht, teilen sie sich. [Diese Mischna stimmt mit Somchos überein, der sagt: Geld, dessen Status (dh Eigentum) zweifelhaft ist, ist geteilt. Dies ist nicht die Halacha. Die Halacha ist, dass die Beweislast bei dem liegt, der seinem Nachbarn (Geld) entziehen würde. Der Claimee schwört, dass er es nicht weiß, und er ist befreit.]
Bartenura on Mishnah Bava Metzia
המשאיל אומר שאולה מתה – and you are liable for its unavoidable accidents.
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English Explanation of Mishnah Bava Metzia
If one borrowed a cow, and borrowed it for half a day and hired it for half a day; or borrowed it for one day and hired it for the next; or if he borrowed one cow, and hired another and the cow died if he that lent the cow says: “It was the borrowed cow that died”, [or] “On the day when it was borrowed it died”, [or] “During the time when it was borrowed it died” and the other one says: “I don’t know”, (1) he is liable. If the hirer says, “It is the hired one that died”, [or] “On the day when it was hired it died”, and the other says, “I do not know”, (1) he is not liable. If the one says, “It was borrowed”, and the other says, “It was hired”, (1) the hirer must take an oath that it was the hired one that died. If the one says, “I do not know”, and the other says, “I do not know”, (1) they share in the loss. There are three possible scenarios mentioned in this mishnah 1) Shimon borrows from Reuven a cow for half a day and rents the same cow for the other half of the day; 2) Shimon borrows the cow for one day and hires it on the next day; 3) Shimon borrows from Reuven one cow and rents a different cow. If the cow should die a natural death it will be in Shimon’s best interest that the cow died while it was being hired, since a hirer does not pay in cases of natural death. It will be in Reuven’s best interest if the cow died while being borrowed since borrowers do pay in cases of natural death. Our mishnah delineates the possible claims of Reuven and Shimon and the law in each case. Case a: If Reuven, who lent the cow, claims that he is certain that the cow died while being rented or that the rented cow died and Shimon claims that he doesn’t know, Shimon is liable. This goes according to the general principle that one who claims that he is certain has a stronger claim then one who claims he is not certain (see Steinsaltz reference guide, page 172. Case b: Similarly, if Shimon claims that he is sure that the cow died while being borrowed or that the borrowed cow died and Reuven claims that he does not know, Shimon is exempt. Since Shimon is certain that the borrowed cow died and Reuven doesn’t know, Shimon’s claim is stronger. Case c: If they disagree and each claims that he is certain, Shimon takes an oath that it died while it was being hired and he is exempt from making restitution. This is based on the principle that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. Since in this case Reuven is the plaintiff and he cannot prove his claim, Shimon is exempt. Case d: If both claim that they are uncertain then they split the loss of the cow. In this case Shimon will pay Reuven half the value of the cow.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Bava Metzia
איני יודע – lest it died while rented out, and am exempt from the unavoidable accidents.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Bava Metzia
חייב – It is not possible to establish our Mishnah as it implies, for we hold that my Maneh is in your hands, and the other says, that he doesn’t know [how the animal died] and he takes an equitable oath (see Shevuot 40b – which is applied, if one who is sued for a debt, denies the latter entirely, in contradistinction to the legal oath which is required when the defendant admits a part of the claim. It being presumed that nobody will go to law unless he has a claim, it is a matter of equity to put the opponent to an oath, to which he may in return put the claimant) that he does not know [how the animal died – if it had been borrowed or tented] and is exempt from payment/penalty. For this reason, we establish in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 98a) that where there is the business of an oath that is Torah mandated between them, such as where [the lender] says to him: I transferred to you two cows, one day as borrowed and the other day as a rental, and both of them (i.e., the cows) died while they were borrowed. And the borrower said to him (i.e., the lender), one of them, yes, at the time while it was borrowed it died. But one of them (i.e., the cows), I don’t know. And this like someone who partially admits to the claim and he is liable for an oath. And because he cannot take an oath, he pays. And it is similar to [the case of] my Maneh is in your hands, and the other responds, How is this? Fifty (i.e., one-half) I know about and fifty (i.e., the other half) I don’t know [anything] about. He is required to take an oath but he is not able to take an oath, and because he is unable to take an oath, he must pay.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Bava Metzia
ישבע השוכר ששכורה מתה – this also is impossible to establish as it implies. And we hold that if one claimed “wheat” and the other admitted to him “barley,” he is exempt even from the cost of the barley. And that is so – that what he admitted to him was not what the other claimed, and what he claimed he (i.e., the other) did not admit to him. And what place is there for an oath? For this we have established in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 98b – a “rolling oath.” The lender can plea: “Even on your own plea, you must still swear that the animal died naturally, not through your negligence” – which rejects the ruling of Rami bar Hama’s ruling that no oath is imposed at all upon bailees, even when they plead loss, theft, death, etc., unless there is also a partial rejection of the claim. The bailee is bound to swear another oath – that the hired one and not the borrowed one has died is administered. The superimposed oath is Biblical, not Rabbinic. See also Sotah 18a). In that he (i.e., the lender/person who rents out the animal) says to the borrower/renter: Swear to me the oath of the bailees that you are required to swear, that she (i.e., the animal) died naturally, for the deponent’s statement is accepted as true on the ground that, if he had intended to tell a lie, he might have invented one more advantageous to his cause – that he could have taken an other that it died naturally for if he made a claim also that via a rolling oath, that she died while rented out.
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Bartenura on Mishnah Bava Metzia
יחלוקו – Our Mishnah is [according to] Sumachus, who stated that monies that are placed in doubt should be divided, and it is not the Halakha, for the Halakha is: “He who wants to exact [compensation] from his fellow bears the burden of proof” (see Mishnah Bava Kamma, Chapter 3, Mishnah 11), and the the one appealed to must take an oath that he doesn’t know and is exempt.
